

# Policing Euro 2000

International police co-operation, information management and police deployment

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## Summary

From June 10, 2000 to July 3, 2000, the European football championships known as Euro 2000, took place in Belgium and the Netherlands. The binational police project dealing with Euro 2000 decided to start an evaluation project to be able to identify important lessons for the future. This project: "Police Expertise Euro 2000" was made possible by European Union funds. In an interim report a model was presented to evaluate large scale police operations in general and Euro 2000 in particular. In this end report, the results of the application of this model to Euro 2000 are presented.

By adopting the handbook, the Council of the European Union requested Member States to step up cooperation, in particular practical cooperation between police forces, in order to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches. The contents of the EU handbook, based as they are on experiences gained during previous championships have proven to be very valuable in the international police cooperation effort during Euro 2000. The fact that the handbook exists, has been adopted by EU countries and has been used explicitly, has undoubtedly made an important contribution to the maintenance of public order during Euro 2000. The evaluation has identified areas for improvement, clarification and continued growth.

It has become clear that public order problems during a championship do not only involve the traditional hooligans travelling from one country to another, be they category C or B. Other individuals or groups may cause or become involved in public order incidents as well. Most notably this could be the local population in any participating country. On the other hand, migrant groups may become involved. The categorisation of individuals into categories seems to become less meaningful as relatively more people not belonging to the highest risk category become involved in incidents. Risk analyses and preventive measures will have to take this into account. This also means that the international police cooperation in relation to international football matches is not just about sending police teams to the organising country. Preventive measures and information gathering within all participating countries are essential. In addition, police measures alone cannot prevent and control public order disturbances. It is therefore necessary to merge the policing initiatives with the initiatives taken from a sports and social preventive perspective.

It has also become clear that the need for international police cooperation does not end after a tournament. Every year and every month, international matches between club teams and between national teams take place all over Europe. Potential risks continue. It would be wise to make the international gathering and exchange of information, as well as the analyses of the risks involved, a continuous process. The quality of the risk analyses needs to be enhanced. Each country has something to contribute to the build-up of experiences and the continuous gathering of relevant information. Thought should be given to the way in which the arrangements of the handbook will be evaluated and amended in future.

International football matches and tournaments in Europe also involve non-EU countries, including candidate member states and members of the Council of Europe. Although these countries clearly had less experience with international police cooperation along the lines of the EU handbook, they showed their willingness to participate. It would be beneficial to make similar arrangements with these countries as well.

Of course, police cooperation and police behaviour are only among the many relevant factors influencing the development and escalation of public order incidents. The most important factor influencing public order and safety surrounding football matches, is the types of individuals that become involved. In this respect, for most countries, fans following the national team usually pose less of a threat to public order than fans following club teams. This in itself limits the number of potential troublemakers coming to an event such as Euro 2000. Further help came from the fact that the national teams with the most violent following were out of the tournament after the first round. In addition, through the international police co-operation effort, many potential troublemakers did not make it to the Netherlands or Belgium at all, because they were persuaded to stay at home or because they were stopped at the border. These circumstances made a friendly but firm hospitality-oriented approach more feasible.

Generally speaking, the conclusion can be drawn that the police deployment contributed to the safe and festive nature of the event. There were only a limited number of mostly minor and short incidents in the host cities. There was a clear distinction between two types of police deployment: “high profile policing” with large numbers of police, partly in riot gear and relatively more “low profile policing”, which was more in line with the “behavioural profile developed before the start of the tournament. Based on the data gathered, several elements of “good practice” could be distinguished. These include the following:

- development of a clear behavioural profile;
- communication and training to implement the behavioural profile;
- continued attention for the behavioural profile during briefings and debriefings, also in the period leading up to the event;
- actively contacting fans (obtaining information, building a relationship);
- making police presence strongly dependent on information gathering and risk analysis;
- police officers patrolling in pairs or small groups;
- police officers being clearly visible, standing out in the crowd;
- clearly communicating tolerance limits and acting on them;
- short and clear command lines.

Part of the project was to establish a useful evaluation methodology. Observations by an independent team of international experts proved to be useful in validating good practices independently and in helping to identify areas for improvement. Seeking feedback from foreign police officers involved in the operation was a simple and effective way to gather valuable information. The concept of evaluation teams (using police officers from other forces and university students) deserves to be developed further. Both the model and the instruments developed in the course of the project police expertise Euro 2000 can be used, with the necessary modifications, on future occasions.

## Foreword

The project Police Expertise Euro 2000 was started on May 1, 1999, over a year before the start of the Euro 2000 football championship itself, to preserve the experiences gained in preparing for the event and to identify lessons to be learnt for the benefit of police organisations across Europe. To this purpose, a model was developed, instruments were developed and tested, cooperation with police forces involved was sought, and a research team was formed to be able to gather data before and during Euro 2000. In an interim report (March 2000), the model to evaluate large scale police operations in general and Euro 2000 in particular was presented. In this end report, the results of the application of this model to Euro 2000 are presented.

The project Police Expertise Euro 2000 is unique in several ways:

- the evaluation has been carefully planned beforehand and is based on data gathered explicitly for the purpose of evaluating;
- the data are gathered in a systematic and structured way with a maximum of objectivity;
- the project is aimed fully at learning for the future (and not at accountability);
- the project has a European perspective and input from police officers from other European countries was explicitly sought.
- through the involvement of police officers, the project directly contributes to learning processes within police organisations;
- by providing direct feed-back during the event itself, the project aimed to contribute to the adequate policing of the event.

The project Police Expertise Euro 2000 was made possible through significant contributions from the European Union (through the OISIN programme), the Belgian Gendarmerie and the Dutch Police Education and Knowledge Centre LSOP. The content of this report and the views contained herein are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of the European Commission or of any organisation.

In all, over 50 people were involved in one way or another to realise the project. We would like to thank:

The international monitoring team:

Malcolm George, Andreas Göhring, Ken Scott and Thierry Terraube, with accompanying officers Wim van de Burgt and Daniel Merlo;

The binational observers:

Ralda van den Berg, Patrick Van den Berghe, Karel Van den Bossche, Marcel Bruinsma, Martijn Caarls, Leon Debruyne, Coralie Dehayes, Christian Denamur, Dirk Dendievel, Piet Drost, Thierry Duchatelet, Filip Feraux, Olivier Honoré, Eddy Langkamp, Jean-Marc Lefere, Johan Leynen, Jacqueline van der Loo, Fred Lubbers, André Maes, Franky Mervielde, Herman Michiels, Myrke Nieweg, Gerard Olthof, Raf Ostach, Cyril Poppelaars, Gerco Renkers, Maartje Rood, Raymond Rossion, Henk Rozema, Geert Soete, Benny Spruijt, Krishna Taneja, Roland Verkest, Guido Verstrepen, Mario Verzele, Cees van Woerkom, Roger Houssier, Jean Claude Mathieu, Ellis van der Wal and Philippe van Wijmeersch;

The interviewers:

Fiona Engbers, Albert Olthof and Anke van der Zijl;

Individuals involved in testing observation instruments

Caroline Huens, Eddy Hendrickx, Johan Heijnemans, Johan Leynen, Benny Maes, Andre Regterschot, Dominique van Ryckeghem and Jan Tuinder;

These people could not have been involved but for the generous support of the organisations that made them available for the project. Especially the following organisations provided assistance:

In the Netherlands: Utrecht police, Twente police, Haaglanden police, Dutch Police Academy, Police Institute Public order and safety, Detective school;

In Belgium: Algemene Politie Steun Dienst, Gendarmerie General Reserve, Gendarmerie schools in Gent, Antwerp, Brabant, Vottem and Jumet, Royal Gendarmerie school, police Torhout, police Roeselaere, police Lierde, police Lierde and police Namur;

In Scotland: Strathclyde Police;

In Germany: Innenministerium Sachsen;

In France: Centre National d' etudes et de formation.

Without the contributions of these organisations, the project would not have been possible.

We would like to thank all of the abovementioned individuals and organisations for their contribution to the project. In addition, we would like to thank all individuals in the host cities, whose cooperation was also essential for a succesfull completion of the project.

In compiling this report, we were assisted by Jacqueline van der Loo and Maartje Rood (who analysed the data on cooperation with stewards) and by Martin Caarls and Franky Mervielde, who analysed the data on the police behavioural profile.

Finally we would like to thank members of the binational police project for their support and cooperation:

Herman Bliki, Marjolein Bontenbal, Theo Brekelmans, Johan Heijnemans, Hugo Michiels, Wim van Oorschot, Jacques van Peer, Rob Siebelink, Ben Takkenberg and Jan Tuinder.

In April 2000, an accompanying committee was set up to monitor the progress of the evaluation and to oversee the adherence to the research plan. The accompanying committee was composed of: Cyrille Fijnaut (chair), Eddy Hendrickx, Willy Heijens, Monique de Knop, Jos Mesu and Philippe Warny. We would like to thank them for their constructive and involved contribution to the project.

Dr. Otto M.J. Adang  
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# 1. Introduction

Football hooliganism has been a concern for over twenty years. Both matches in national competitions of several countries and international matches have been accompanied by violent incidents. In the past, both the Council of Europe and the European Union have adopted several measures and resolutions to combat football hooliganism and to increase police co-operation during the policing of football matches. On June 14, 1999, the European Union adopted a “Handbook for international police co-operation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches” (in which at least one Member State is involved either by participation in the match or by hosting the match). In the remainder of this report, this handbook will be referred to as the “EU-handbook”.

During a big event such as the European football championships, where the national teams of 16 countries participate, assuring public safety may be even more complex than in the case of a single match. Larger numbers of fans are involved, who may stay for several days or weeks, travelling between different places. As a result, a large number of organisations is involved in dealing with public safety and the risk of public order problems increases. Euro 2000 was a special case, as it was organised by two countries. The territories of these organising countries are relatively small. As a consequence, at any time visitors could easily travel between each of the eight host cities or to other towns. Most participating countries were relatively close to the host countries. Borders are open and excellent connections by air, rail, water and road existed. Both Belgium and the Netherlands are densely populated and many special events were held during Euro 2000. In addition, every year many tourists visit these countries in June. On top of that: over the years both Belgium and the Netherlands have had incidents of football hooliganism.

Naturally, Belgium and the Netherlands wanted Euro 2000 to develop in a safe and festive way for all concerned. To help achieve that aim, the governments decided to make maximal use of international police co-operation according to the principles of the European handbook. The organising countries also considered that a consistent approach of fans would be helpful. Therefore, a uniform “police behavioural profile” was developed. At the core of this profile was the idea that a friendly but strict approach would be most suitable.

A supposition behind both the “behavioural profile” and the measures in the European handbook is that an information driven police operation combined with a friendly but firm approach of fans by police officers decreases the likelihood of violent incidents, compared to a more reactive and repressive approach. Both practically and scientifically, it is important to investigate whether or not this supposition is correct. Euro 2000 provided an excellent opportunity to test whether or not the measures taken had the intended effects. The project Police Expertise Euro 2000 was set up to achieve that aim. More specifically the project was meant to evaluate the methods mentioned in Chapters 1-4 of the European handbook (pertaining to the preparation by police forces, the organisation of co-operation by police forces, information management and the co-operation between police and stewards) and the functionality of the police behavioural profile. Although the wider context is not neglected, this report therefore does not address issues such as ticketing, accommodation of fans, traffic control, etc.

In the course of the project, answers were sought to the following questions:

- Were measures taken as intended?
- Did the measures have the expected effects?
- What unforeseen circumstances occurred?
- What was the response to these unforeseen circumstances?

To be able to answer these questions objectively, data were gathered in a systematic and structured way, according to the model developed well before the start of Euro 2000. Feedback from foreign police officers was explicitly sought. As part of the project, an international monitoring team independently made their own observations in all eight host cities. The international monitoring team summarised their findings in a separate report, which is added in full in Appendix I of this report. An explicit aim of the project was to evaluate the practicability and usefulness of the evaluation model.

This report is divided into 11 chapters.

Chapter 2 presents a summary of the general model (described in the interim report) to evaluate large scale police operations;

Chapter 3 deals with the broader context of the policing of Euro 2000;

Chapter 4 makes clear in what manner data were gathered (details of the method used are to be found in Appendix III);

Chapter 5 deals with the preparation by police forces (contained in chapter 1 of the EU handbook);

Chapter 6 deals with international police co-operation (contained in chapter 2 of the EU handbook);

Chapter 7 deals with information management (contained in chapter 3 of the EU handbook).

Chapter 8 deals with the co-operation between police and stewards (contained in chapter 4 of the EU handbook);

Chapter 9 summarises the recommendations relevant to the EU handbook.

Chapter 10 deals with the functionality of the police behavioural profile;

Chapter 11 evaluates the evaluation methodology used.

## **2. A GENERAL MODEL FOR THE EVALUATION OF LARGE-SCALE POLICE OPERATIONS**

### **2.1 Introduction**

The evaluation of a particular large-scale police operation is often hampered by the tension between accountability and learning for the future. To an organisation that wants to improve its professionalism, evaluation ought to have another significance than that of subsequent justification. Evaluation should be a means to come to a learning organisation. In an evaluation with such goals of learning, it is not relevant whether serious disturbances of public order arose or not (the criteria stated in the Dutch riot police regulations). It is important to explicitly include the evaluation in the early beginning of the organisation of a large-scale operation. Without a previously established plan, evaluation does not make much sense.

### **2.2 Aim of the evaluation**

The point of departure of such an evaluation plan is the aim of the evaluation. It should always be determined in advance. Only then it is possible to choose the most appropriate method to answer the questions involved. The quality model used in the Dutch police (the NKP-model) distinguishes between nine fields. There are five organisation fields: leadership, personnel management, policy and strategy, means management and procedure management. Four fields of results: appreciation by staff members, clients and society and company results (financial or otherwise).

When evaluating a particular large-scale police operation, in any case attention has to be paid to the management of procedures. This includes defining the procedures used. It should be stressed that the use of this quality model does not necessarily mean one has to think solely or mainly in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.

One must distinguish between main procedures, auxiliary procedures and stipulating procedures. It is also important to distinguish between procedures at micro-level (the event itself and its approach), at meso-level (regarding the organisation in general, detached from the specific event) and at macro-level (the social context of the organisation and of the events). It is also important to be aware of the phasing in time: before, during and after the event. The evaluation can include elements to be determined in advance, from the decision-making and preparation up to the actual realisation and the results achieved. The evaluation then offers different lines of approach: tactics, judicial aspects, professionalism and so on. Standard questions that need to be dealt with are:

- \* was the work/action performed as intended and agreed on?
- \* did the action have the assumed effect on the expected problems?
- \* which unforeseen circumstances occurred and why?
- \* how was this dealt with?

The manner in which this is evaluated determines the depth in which these questions and other ones can be answered.

### **2.3 Evaluation method**

Although the competent authority has the final responsibility for the evaluation, each executive is personally responsible for the evaluation of the units under his command and for the lessons to be learned for future actions. In practice, this varies and evaluation is often

minimal. At the very least an organisation should set minimum standards for the evaluation of public order policing by those directly involved in the operation.

These minimum standards should include structured debriefings, which should form part of the operational plans. Time, form and contents of the debriefing are to be determined. This approach is especially appropriate to compare the plan and the execution at the micro-level as striking elements come to the fore even without the oriented gathering of information on specific points.

Following items need to be set to structure the debriefing:

- during the operation, each unit keeps a log, starting at the briefing;
- set a the time at which feedback resulting from the debriefing should be given;
- set a structure for the debriefing. In practice, it is often a good method to go through the operation in chronological order (starting at the briefing) by means of the approach plan (for the unit concerned) and the log. The first goal is to become clear on whether everybody has the same view on what actually happened. Combining information from different sources may complete each individual's knowledge. In case of widely differing views, a potential area of growth has been identified;
- written feedback should be given to the evaluation co-ordinator/ General Commander/ Gold Commander with the following information: unit, commander, time and place deployment, time debriefing, nature of the actual operation, use of violence, arrests, persons injured, damage, functional plan of action, departures from plan of action, moot points and/or areas of growth, proposals for modification;
- the debriefing is also a kind of aftercare, and a way to establish where further emotional after-care is needed.

In some cases (e.g. on special occasions or once a year), additional review among colleagues, using experienced observers from other police forces should be considered. In foreseeable exceptional cases, review among colleagues rounded up with external persons or an evaluation by external persons is called for. It is then important to have a provision guaranteeing that all lessons drawn from the evaluations are reported in a recoverable manner for the benefit of training and future operations. No matter which method is used, it is important in all cases to determine **in advance** how and under whose responsibility the evaluation will be done and how it will be reported.

## **2.4 Review among colleagues**

Involving colleagues from outside police forces in the evaluation of large-scale police operations seems to have several advantages. Over the past few years, the Netherlands experienced a number of successes in review among colleagues. Colleagues from other police regions than those involved and collaborators from the Police Institute Public order and Safety gathered and analysed information during or after an event. It appeared that the deployment of persons with a role of mere observer yielded a clear surplus value to the benefit of the evaluation. The deployment of experienced police officers (no matter which force they work in) as observers in a large-scale operation offered them a lot of learning experiences. Ideally, participants in review among colleagues had several years of experience in large-scale operation, had a function at tactical or strategic level in their own organisation in case of large-scale operation and had followed a specific training preparing them for a review among colleagues. However, others could also be deployed if necessary, on the basis of their specific expertise. A thorough recording of the actual course of the events simplified the discussion of possible areas of growth.

The point of departure for a review among colleagues is that the police force concerned remains responsible for its own evaluation, the General Commander/Gold Commander is the interlocutor for the evaluation team and the General Commander/Commander discusses evaluation matters with the competent authorities. The method of review among colleagues can then be the following: points of evaluation are agreed on in consultation with the General Commander/Gold Commander. An evaluation plan is then made up. This plan indicates who is in charge of what with respect to evaluation, how and by whom the evaluation will be carried out and which feedback moments (orally and in writing) are set. The evaluation team deploys a process counsellor and a number of observers/reviewers. The organising force also provides a number of persons with a mere observational function and no operational function. Besides that, it supplies a liaison to guide the evaluation team. It is determined whether others participate in the evaluation (trainers, external experts in specific fields, members from the public). In implementation, collaborators of the evaluation team carry out observations (and are enabled to do so) and they take interviews that are directly recorded and worked up as soon as possible. The findings of the evaluation team are drawn up in a report that is presented to the General Commander/Gold Commander.

For a smooth proceeding of the review among colleagues it is important to set some starting points.

1. The review among colleagues does not replace regular briefings, debriefings and account processes. The reporting of meetings, decision-making documents, approach plans, logs/journals, briefing, debriefing and so on needs to be seen to in the organisation of each particular large-scale police operation.
2. The evaluation does not aim at the appraisal of officials or their actions yet at an evaluation providing insight into the relevant procedures and moments of decision-making and on the effects of the decisions.
3. It is determined in advance, in writing, what the evaluation specifically aims at, who is in charge of what, how the evaluation is carried out and which feedback moments (orally and in writing) are set.
4. The reviewers have access to all relevant information.
5. For the review among colleagues, persons who have several years of experience in particular large-scale police operation in their own organisation are deployed. Members of the force involved support them.
6. The findings of the evaluation team are drawn up in a report that is presented to the General Commander/Gold Commander. The report is and remains the General Commander/Gold Commander's property and is not public. The General Commander/Gold Commander can put the report (either completed with remarks or not) at the disposal of the competent authority if desired. It can then be used as a basis for the administrative evaluation.

## **2.5 Planning an evaluation**

To properly plan an evaluation, the following steps are important.

1. Appoint an evaluation co-ordinator as soon as possible;
2. Determine an approach plan for the evaluation. It should be determined in consultation with the General Commander/Gold Commander which questions will be answered during the evaluation and which tools will be used to that end;
3. Compose an evaluation team with colleagues from different forces;
4. Carry out observations during the event; take interviews in accordance with the "evaluation approach plan" that was drawn up. The evaluation team proceedings do not replace yet complement the regular debriefing activities;

5. Report to the General Commander as arranged.

The **evaluation co-ordinator** determines the areas of evaluation in consultation with the General Commander/Gold Commander. He draws up an evaluation plan and composes and leads an evaluation team. He co-ordinates the evaluation activities and is responsible for the compilation and analysis of the results and the composition of the report.

Once it has been determined which points the evaluation has to concentrate on, an **evaluation plan** is drawn up. This always includes the starting time of the evaluation activities and the time at which the report should be ready, the aim of the evaluation including specific points to be evaluated as well as the criteria the evaluation must meet. The evaluation plan also states the organisation of the evaluation, identifies internal and external persons involved in the evaluation and evaluation instruments to be deployed. Facilities and means needed are made explicit as well as costs related to the evaluation. Evaluation activities to be carried out should be specified. These include the gathering and analysing of material (in writing, on audiotape, on videotape) about the event and the context in which the event takes place and the analysis and reporting.

The **evaluation report should** always contain the following topics:

- The goal of the evaluation (the general aim will be to bring the main choices into the limelight and to place them in the right context, to pointing out what the consequences of these choices were and to identify possible areas of growth for the future);
- method followed;
- context of the event (social background, connection with previous events, current regulations, usual procedures, recent developments);
- an objectified representation in phases of events and decisive moments (before, during, after). The aim is not to make the “one and only correct” version but, if required, to indicate for which items the versions differ;
- an inventory of points of particular interest and areas of growth as they are identified by the persons concerned;
- conclusions, bearing in mind that these are observations of facts and not judgements;
- recommendations, explaining which criteria were used to come to those recommendations.

The evaluation should use clearly identified and preferably generally accepted **criteria** (when applicable) such as:

1. International legislation and regulation: European Treaty of Human Rights, New York Treaty and so on; with regard to football hooliganism the European convention and the EU manual;
2. National legislation and regulation (e.g.: Constitution, Police law, Instruction on the use of force, Law on public demonstrations, Municipal law, Football law);
3. National / interregional police agreements (in the Netherlands e.g.: frame of reference crisis and conflict management, final attainment levels training, professional code, NKP model; in Belgium e.g.: protocol agreements, five-cornered discussion);
4. Regional / local models and instructions.

A large scope of **tools or instruments** can be deployed for evaluation. The choice of the tools to use will be influenced by the aim of the evaluation and the required depth. It is important to ensure continuity to make evaluation results available for colleagues and training and to make previously developed tools and checklists usable for others. It is therefore desirable to have a

**central point** in which relevant information is stored or where it is known where relevant information is available. It is then possible to develop and establish professional standards together. When setting up evaluation teams, it could be useful for different forces to collaborate (on the basis of geographical proximity or existing collaboration in other fields, for instance).

## **3. Policing Euro 2000**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Policing measures always fall within the framework provided by the authorities. The governments of Belgium and the Netherlands opted for a pro-active, preventive approach to ensure the festive, safe nature of Euro 2000. To prepare for the event, a government framework of basic policy assumptions and tolerance limits was drawn up. The governments made arrangements concerning the possible application of Section 2, subsection 2 of the Schengen treaty, which allows for the temporary reinstatement of controls on the Belgian/Dutch borders with neighbouring countries. Together, both governments set requirements for ticket sales and minimum conditions for deployment of stewards. The basic security assumptions surrounding Euro 2000 were that the organisers would bear primary responsibility inside, and the police outside the stadiums. As experiences from other tournaments indicated the complex but vital impact of ticketing, ticket sales were regulated to bring about controlled sales. The aim was to bring about maximum fan separation and to eliminate the "anonymity" of spectators wherever possible.

Arrangements were made related to the transport of fans, hospitality, accompaniment of and communication with fans, legal aspects, a joint visa policy and accreditation. In addition, a binational police project was set up and Belgium and the Netherlands concluded a treaty to achieve maximum police co-operation with respect to supportive, general and technical services (exchange of intelligence, supervision of fans, use of materials, traffic control, etc.). The treaty also contained arrangements that made cross-border policing possible in specified circumstances.

### **3.2 Fans: accompaniment and communication**

Effective communication was considered to make a significant contribution to making Euro 2000 a safe and festive event. This applied to public announcements with respect to tolerance limits, ticket policy as well as to police conduct and to mutual communication among the various organisations and individuals involved. An information folder explaining tolerance limits was sent to those who bought tickets. Authorities in participating countries were asked to make announcements about tolerance limits.

The football unions of the participating countries were asked to provide stewards to accompany fans travelling in an organised manner. Seven countries did provide stewards (Germany, Slovenia, England, Czech Republic, France, Sweden and Norway). They fulfilled no function inside the stadia, but only during transport on buses, trains and aeroplanes that had been organised by the national union.

To accompany fans not travelling in an organised manner or staying in the Netherlands or Belgium for a longer time, teams of fan co-ordinators were deployed to ensure a problem-free stay. Fan co-ordinators originated from fan organisations of participating countries. Their task was to man fan embassies and to inform, support and provide service to fans. They were expected to actively contact fans of their country, to answer any questions they might have and to call attention to problems that could affect the festive nature of the event. For this purpose in Belgium and the Netherlands and Belgium central points for the fan co-ordinators were established, which co-ordinated deployment of the fan co-ordinators. The fan co-ordinators received a small fee (made possible by the national governments). Previous to Euro 2000, fanco-ordinators received a short training. Experienced Dutch and Belgian fan co-

ordinators (so-called pilots) were responsible for contacts between foreign fan co-ordinators and local organisations, including local authorities. In addition, a Dutch and Belgian team of professional fan co-ordinators was deployed to contact fans of their respective countries.

### **3.3 Legal aspects: harmonisation**

Belgium and the Netherlands, being sovereign countries, have their own laws. In preparing for Euro 2000, initiatives were taken to harmonise legislation to some extent. E.g. in Belgium, but not in the Netherlands, administrative detention competencies existed. Therefore, in the Netherlands, a bill was prepared to be able to impose legal restrictions on the freedom of movement when necessary (it was not in fact used during Euro 2000). The Netherlands, but not Belgium, has the legal possibility to use a quick route to bring perpetrators to trial. Belgium also introduced legislation to this effect (it was used on one occasion). However, differences in legislation remained and both countries did not have the same legal tools available to them. E.g. Belgium adopted a “Football law”, dedicated specifically to football related offences. In the Netherlands, such a law does not exist.

### **3.4 Police: co-operation**

Before and during Euro 2000 co-operation at operational levels was sought between the Netherlands and Belgium. To this purpose, a binational police co-operation project was set up, in which six domains for co-operation were distinguished:

1. Presentation: a “police conduct” profile was developed and taught to achieve a uniform way of dealing with fans in both countries (see Chapter 9);
2. Attention: activities of potential risk-groups were to be followed attentively, to make early intervention possible;
3. Information: information was considered to be the most critical resource. One binational police information centre was established before and during Euro 2000 (see Chapter 7);
4. Communication: a media and communication strategy was developed to communicate effectively with fans and visitors;
5. Co-operation: international police co-operation was considered to be of strategic importance (see Chapters 5 and 6);
6. Evaluation: the project Police Expertise Euro 2000, this report.

The government framework of basic policy assumptions and tolerance limits stated that visitors would have to be treated as guests and would be expected to act as guests. Misconduct would be dealt with immediately and offenders would be prosecuted under criminal law. The police would have to contribute to the festive nature of the event. Police deployment would have to be aimed at keeping the peace, employing a mixture of preventive, pro-active and restraining methods. For this purpose, a profile of police conduct was formulated. A binational information platform and a binational police information centre were set up for the provision of administrative and operational intelligence. Participating countries were asked to assist the police forces in Belgium and the Netherlands and make a direct contribution to security by sending police spotters.

### **3.5 Public order during Euro 2000**

During Euro 2000, 31 matches were played in eight cities. The main events involving violence or potentially affecting public safety may be summarised as follows.

Incidents inside or directly surrounding the stadiums were very rare. On two occasions one or two fans were able to enter the playing field at the close of a match. On one occasion a referee was hit by coins. On one occasion a group of (English) fans in vain tried to storm a gate. The incident that attracted most attention was a disagreement between stewards and Italian journalists just prior to the final, which resulted in the arrest of seven journalists.

Both in Belgium and the Netherlands several hundred individuals were arrested in relation to the “black-market” sale of tickets.

During Euro 2000, the arrival of fans at the borders was closely monitored and on several occasions fans were stopped from entering Belgium or the Netherlands. This mainly concerned German fans, several hundreds of which were stopped. The German police had also taken initiatives to prevent potentially troublesome fans from travelling.

In the Netherlands, following matches of the national team, short violent outbursts occurred on more than one occasion in several cities. These incidents were most severe after the match in which the Dutch team was kicked out of the tournament.

In Belgium, English fans were involved in several incidents. Most media attention focused on the “high risk match” between England and Germany in Charleroi. Following incidents in Brussels and Charleroi, a lot of English fans were arrested and transported back to the United Kingdom. UEFA threatened to exclude the English national team from the tournament in the event of more incidents involving English fans.

Both in Belgium and in the Netherlands, migrants from Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco were involved in several, mostly minor, incidents.

Most incidents that occurred during Euro 2000, took place after matches and outside the host-cities. Maybe the most violent single incident took place after the final, when celebrating fans rioted in Paris (France)!

## **4. Evaluating Euro 2000**

### **4.1 Introduction**

As explained in Chapter 1, the project Police Expertise Euro 2000 was set up to be able to evaluate specific aspects of the police operation in preparation of and during Euro 2000. . The project was prepared and carried out by a team headed by a project manager from the Dutch LSOP Police Education and Knowledge Centre and an assistant project manager from the Belgian Gendarmerie. The project was divided into two phases. During the preparatory phase, an evaluation model was developed and written down in an interim report (Adang, 2000). The report included a research plan. In the second phase, data were gathered and subsequently analysed according to the plan developed previously. These activities will be dealt with in some detail below to allow for a better understanding of the remainder of this report.

### **4.2 Preparations**

Preparations for the data collection process during Euro 2000 were made between May 1, 1999 and June 1, 2000. These preparations included the development of the evaluation model and the instruments to be used (see below: data collection). On several occasions the observation instruments were tested and when necessary adapted. An international monitoring team comprising experienced police officers from the UK, France and Germany was composed, two accompanying officers (one from the Netherlands and one from Belgium) were added to the team. The international monitoring team met with accompanying officers and the project manager two times before Euro 2000 to discuss their role and to receive information about police preparations for Euro 2000.

In all 38 observers were selected and trained to form eight binational evaluation teams (one in each host city). The teams were composed of police trainers, police officers and students from universities.

The training lasted one day and informed the observers about Euro 2000, the evaluation project and the observation instruments to be used. The training also included some observation exercises. Details on the training are given in Appendix II. After having followed the training, the observers were required to participate at least once in a practical real-life exercise well in advance of Euro 2000. In the weeks preceding Euro 2000, each team gathered information in the host city in which it would make observations and prepared a work file. The work file included maps of the stadium and the city centre, perimeters and stadium access, the perimeter set-up, information about specific measures per host city and useful contact information. Shortly before the start of the tournament the observers received a briefing.

Logistical preparations (transport, mobile phones, accommodation, accreditation, computers, working space etc.) were arranged for the binational evaluation teams and the international monitoring team. In addition, three interviewers were selected and briefed to conduct standardised interviews with foreign spotters' teams. During the preparatory phase, documentation and information related to police preparations for Euro 2000 was gathered as well. To this purpose, preparatory seminars organised by the binational police project or the governments of the organising countries were attended. At the final seminar, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire.

At the end of the preparatory phase an accompanying committee was set up to monitor the execution of the research plan. The accompanying committee was composed of

representatives of Belgian and Dutch governments and police services and chaired by an independent professor.

At several points during this period, communication took place with all involvees (representatives of foreign police teams, police forces in Belgium and the Netherlands and security managers) about goals and methods used in the course of the project. This culminated in the organisation of a meeting with Gold Commanders or their representatives from all host cities. At this meeting, participants presented their operational plans to each other and to the international monitoring team.

### **4.3 Data collection**

During Euro 2000 data were collected in several ways.

The international monitoring team visited all host cities at least once. Within 24 h after each observation day, the team summarised their observations and completed a questionnaire on international police co-operation. In addition, individual team members completed a questionnaire on police conduct after every observation day. The team made a separate report about their methodology and findings (Appendix I).

In each host city, a binational evaluation team of at least four observers conducted systematic and structured observations on match days, attended briefings and held ad hoc interviews with police officers, stewards or fans. Observations were conducted both in the streets, on the site and in police information centres. Use was made of the previously developed observation procedures (Appendix III). Three different observation procedures were developed: a procedure for observing the interaction between police and fans in the host cities, a procedure to observe site security management (including co-operation between police and stewards) and a procedure to observe information management at information centres. Co-ordinators saw to it that data were collected in a uniform and accurate way. Every match day, a few stewards and police officers deployed in and around stadia were asked (via their superiors) to complete a questionnaire on the co-operation between police and stewards. Within 24 h after each observation day, the teams summarised their observations. In addition, team members recorded their observations in individual diaries.

Observations were also made and ad hoc interviews were held in the binational information centre and the Belgian national information centre throughout the tournament.

After each period in a host city, members of spotters' teams completed a questionnaire on police conduct (the same questionnaire as the one completed by the international monitoring team, with some additional questions on international police co-operation). Spotters' teams that had finished their activities (because the national team of their country had been kicked out of the tournament) were interviewed to hear their experiences.

Shortly after Euro 2000, interviews were held with some members of the binational police project and some security managers.

### **4.4 Data analysis**

In all, the binational observation teams produced a summary report following each match-day (in total 31 reports). The international team did the same for each of their observation days (producing another 11 reports). In addition, members of the binational teams produced a total

of 149 individual diaries. The systematic observations of the binational teams resulted in 77 reports related to information management, 34 Excel files containing observations made on the sites and 52 Excel files containing observations made in the host cities. In addition, 18 interviews with foreign spotters' teams were conducted. The foreign spotters' teams together with the international monitoring team completed 197 questionnaires on the police behavioural profile. In all, 213 questionnaires on the co-operation between police and stewards were completed.

The quantitative data were analysed using SPSS. The results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses are dealt with in the next chapters. For the different subjects the following data were used.

**Preparations for international police co-operation** (see Chapter 5)

- observation of preparatory meetings;
- exit-interviews with foreign police teams;
- interviews with members of the binational police project;
- written documentation.

**The organisation of international police co-operation** (see Chapter 6)

- observation of preparatory meetings;
- exit-interviews with foreign police teams;
- interviews with members of binational police project;
- written documentation;
- ad libitum information provided by the binational observation teams;
- questionnaires completed by the international monitoring team.

**Information management** (see Chapter 7)

- observations and interviews by the binational teams in local and regional information centres;
- ad libitum observations by the international monitoring team;
- written documentation;
- observations and interviews in the binational police information centre and the Belgian national police information centre.

**Co-operation between police and stewards** (see Chapter 8)

- systematic observations by the binational teams in and around sites;
- ad libitum observations by the international monitoring team;
- interviews with security managers;
- written documentation;
- questionnaires filled out by stewards and police officers deployed on sites.

**Police behaviour** (see Chapter 10)

- systematic observations and ad hoc interviews by binational teams in the streets;
- ad libitum observations by international monitoring team;
- written documentation;
- checklists completed by spotter teams and international monitoring team.

## **5. Preparations for international police co-operation**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The decision that Belgium and the Netherlands were to organise Euro 2000 fell in July 1995. In both countries police preparations started in earnest in 1997, one year after Euro 96 was held in the United Kingdom. In 1997, the Interior Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands signed an agreement to co-operate and both the binational and national police projects started.

According to the EU handbook of 1999, the quality of action by the police in a host country will be improved if it obtains police support from the countries from which violent supporters come. More specifically, international police co-operation can aid in ensuring the safety of the event, by means of intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, spotting and crowd control under supervision of the police of the host country. Both the host country and other countries involved have specific responsibilities. The police forces from the supporting countries are responsible for providing an advance risk analysis and for indicating the extent to which they can meet the request to provide support for the police force of the organising country. The scale of the foreign police team will be determined in consultation.

Based on the risk analysis of the fan group from the country concerned, the host country determines which of the four areas of police co-operation mentioned above is to be requested. The scale of the foreign police team will then be determined in consultation with the countries concerned. The size of the police team will therefore not be the same for all countries, but will relate to some extent to the threat and risk posed by fans from the country concerned and to practicalities

According to the EU handbook, the police forces of the host country should only request foreign police support from countries that can contribute added value. The request for support should be made to the foreign police force well in advance, so as to allow for at least eight weeks' preparation time. The formal request for support should come from the Minister responsible in the organising country, who will receive advice from the police forces concerned. Taking into account the specific aims of the co-operation, the request should mention the scale and composition of support.

The police forces in the organising country should provide an opportunity for the supporting foreign police forces to acquaint themselves with the organisation of police operations in the host country and/or the venue towns and with stadium location, as well as to get to know the operational commanders at the venue towns on the match days.

In the course of the project Police Expertise Euro 2000 (which started in May, 1999), data on preparations for international police co-operation were obtained by observing the seminars and conferences organised by the host countries, by analysing documents prepared by the host countries and through interviews with members of the binational police project.

No data were gathered on the efforts of governments and police forces within participating countries, which were undoubtedly of influence on the presence or behaviour of fans in the host countries as well. In this chapter, the preparations for the international police co-operation during Euro 2000 will be described. In the next chapter, attention will be devoted to the actual organisation of international police co-operation within the host countries and the views of those involved in the international police co-operation effort.

## 5.2 Gathering information

To prepare the police organisation of Euro 2000 in general, and the international police co-operation in particular, members of the binational police project started out by looking for information about the organisation of similar events in the past. However, it turned out that very few written evaluations or other insightful documentation existed. Despite the fact that as a result of European football competitions, fans regularly travel to other countries, a considerable amount of energy had to be spent to establish contacts and to open up networks. Depending on the specific characteristics of the country concerned, involvement of embassies and consulates could prove useful. Contacts with countries that had their own problems with football fans were characterised by developing good working arrangements, whereas contacts with other countries were characterised by raising their awareness and motivating them to provide assistance.

The activities within the Council of Europe (for an overview see Valk & Adang, 1999) and the police working group of the European Union meant that some useful arrangements and “good practices” had already been identified. The EU handbook of 1999 was the result of experiences gained with previous international police co-operation around football matches, especially during Euro 96 and the 98 World Cup, which built on the so-called Swedish model developed for Euro 92.

Because the World Football Championships in 1998 were held in Europe (viz. in France), this provided an ideal opportunity to learn from the organisation of a very similar big event. Police officers involved in the preparations for Euro 2000 were present during France 98 and were able to make many useful observations (e.g. Brekelmans, 1998).

## 5.3 Exchanging information

At an early stage, the binational police project involved other European countries. Four months after France 98 (and 20 months before the start of Euro 2000), Belgium and the Netherlands organised a seminar (**Seminar Euro 2000, October 26 - 27 1998, Brussels**) for participants from all countries that could potentially be involved in Euro 2000. In addition to participants from Belgium and the Netherlands, 16 participants from 10 countries (7 of which would later qualify for Euro2000) attended the seminar. The aim of the conference was to hear about experiences from France 98 (a representative from France was invited for this purpose) and to discuss possible differences between France 98 and Euro 2000. In addition, the seminar was organised to inform participants about preparations in the Netherlands and Belgium and to ask them to give an overview of issues related to football violence, fan behaviour and relevant legal instruments in their respective countries. Also, participants were asked to provide relevant data and to indicate possibilities to send spotters to Euro 2000 (Seminar Euro 2000, 1998).

A second meeting (**Brussels, January 13-14, 1999**) followed this seminar with participants from Belgium, the Netherlands and France to discuss the experiences from France 98 in greater depth. Of course, international police co-operation was an important issue discussed during this event.

Some seven months before Euro 2000 the “first” seminar in preparation of the international police co-operation was held (**The Hague, October 25-26 1999**). Broad invitations were sent out to police officers (operational or involved in information processing) and government officials (Home and Justice departments) of countries potentially participating (at this stage

the qualification process was not yet finished), transit countries and neighbouring countries as well as countries whose fans could constitute a risk for public order. In addition to participants from Belgium and the Netherlands, 20 participants from 15 countries (11 of which were already qualified or would later qualify for Euro2000) attended the seminar. Information was supplied about the policy of the host countries, the operational organisation, information management and stewarding. During the discussions attention focused on the policy concerning the application of section 2, subsection 2 of Schengen, the policy and tolerance limits, treatment of hooligans and fans, ticketing strategy and the response to black market sale of tickets, fan embassies and the potential involvement of migrant groups. In addition to the general set up, the EU handbook and international police co-operation were discussed. A profile of the required foreign police officers was given, as well as an overview of the intended information structure and facilities to be made available. Participants provided a first risk analysis of fans of their country and promised to supply relevant information, to detach liaison officers to the police co-ordination centres and to make a police team available. Attention was drawn to the fact that whereas intelligence gathering is important, using it is vital.

Some four months before Euro 2000 the “second” seminar in preparation of the international police co-operation was held (**2<sup>nd</sup> International seminar Euro 2000, February 10-11, the Hague**). 83 participants from all countries that qualified for Euro 2000 (and from Japan, one of the organisers of the World Football Championships in 2002) were present.

With the draw complete and the first competition schedule in place, the seminar focused on the leaders of police delegations or (if these were not yet appointed) on the persons responsible for assembling the delegation. The objective was to exchange information, to discuss matters in more definite terms and to update the risk analysis. Topics on the conference agenda included the effects of the draw and risk analysis, the composition of foreign police teams and the necessary follow up arrangements (next conference, contact points).

Questions by participants focused on border controls, applicable legislation, applicability of stadium bans, possibilities in participating and organising countries, fan projects and fan coaching initiatives as well as information management.

Less than one month before Euro 2000 the “third” seminar in preparation of the international police co-operation was held (**International conference Euro 2000, May 9-10, Rotterdam**). The objective of the conference was to reach final agreement in detail in preparation for Euro 2000 and to foster contacts between the many police professionals involved. For that purpose, police officers that would be present during Euro 2000 were invited specifically. There were 134 participants, 48 of which were from participating countries other than the organising countries. Also present were participants from South Korea and Japan (organisers of World Championship 2002) and Morocco (at that time candidate for the organisation of the 2006 World Cup). Topics on the conference agenda included the public authority and police structures during the championship, police organisations in the organising countries, information management and the policy framework for Euro 2000, including aliens policy. In dialogue with the participants an actualised risk analysis was attempted and details about foreign police teams were discussed.

An **information package** for governments of countries qualified for Euro 2000 was distributed. This information package contained details about the Belgian- Dutch co-operation and about legislation, police structures and specific measures in the Netherlands and Belgium.

After the conference, delegation leaders of foreign teams made **working visits** to the host cities, where they met with commanding police officers. They were accompanied by the Belgian and Dutch police officers that were to accompany them during Euro 2000 (and who had also been present at the conference). Liaison officers made a three-day visit to the binational police information centre in Driebergen where they were given training with the computer-based information exchange system.

41 out of 48 foreign police officers completed a short **questionnaire** (a response rate of 85%). About one-third of them had been present at the first or second conference (or both) and almost all (88%) indicated that they were familiar with the contents of the EU handbook, which they thought adequate. They indicated that it would be useful to update the handbook after Euro 2000 and that the measures contained in the handbook would be useful in co-operating with non-EU countries as well. Some participants indicated that it would be useful to pay more attention in the handbook to the rights and duties of foreign police officers and to their protection.

The participants identified several factors that could potentially stand in the way of successful international co-operation. Lack of information, misunderstandings as a result of cultural or linguistic differences and operational inflexibility were named as potential pitfalls. Some participants feared that in practice some liaison-officers would not always have the knowledge expected of them.

The seminars seemed to have fulfilled their function. According to their answers on the questionnaire, the foreign participants to the last seminar indicated that they considered themselves to be well informed about police preparations for Euro 2000 (average score 4,4 on a scale with a maximum of 5) and about their own role during Euro 2000 (average score 4,3). They felt that conditions for successful international co-operation were met (average score 4,2), that this co-operation would make an important contribution to a safe Euro 2000 (average score 4,8) and that Belgian and Dutch police would make maximal use of their expertise (average score 4,6). Asked if they felt that many important things still needed to be done, their answers indicated that this was not the case (average score 2,0).

#### **5.4 Other preparations**

In addition to the seminars, both members of the national and local police projects in the host countries visited a number of matches in which teams tried to qualify for Euro 2000. This allowed them to make international contacts and to get acquainted with the behaviour of foreign fans.

At a governmental level, the Belgian and Dutch Interior ministers paid visits to their foreign colleagues in the months preceding Euro 2000 and made formal agreements to co-operate on the basis of the EU handbook. Members of the binational police project prepared these visits. On several occasions prior to these visits, the Interior Ministers informed their EU colleagues about the preparations for Euro 2000 (e.g. letter of March 29, 1999).

In preparation of the risk analyses, the Belgian government commissioned a study by the University of Liege to gather data on the behaviour of European football fans and hooligans. The final report of March 1999 (Comeron & De Meulenaer, 1999) included lessons learnt from previous tournaments, a typology of European fans and details on fans and hooligans by country. Answers to questionnaires sent out to governments/ police forces in European countries formed an important source for this study

## 5.5 Conclusions

In preparing for international police co-operation during a big event as Euro 2000, a strong interdependence exists between different European countries. The host countries are dependent on participating countries as well as neighbouring countries and transit countries for information and support. These other countries need to invest in several manners as well: they have to take measures in their own country; they have to gather information and to prepare themselves in time to be able to send police teams to the host country.

It is telling in this respect that a university was asked to gather the basic information necessary for a first risk analysis. One wonders why the existing networks were not able to provide or gather the necessary information themselves.

Because of this interdependence, a constant dialogue between the countries concerned seems to be called for. All seminars were organised by both government and police representatives of the two host countries and seemed to achieve their aim of providing information. Although the host countries actively sought dialogue, the image that remained after the seminars was that, with regard to most countries, the information flow was mainly one-way. The host countries provided information about their preparations for Euro 2000 and especially about the intended international police co-operation on the basis of the EU handbook.

Discussions and questions asked during the seminars indicated which subjects seemed to be most important to other countries. Most often, participants wanted to know more about the legal system in the host countries, the way in which tolerance limits would be communicated and adhered to, border controls during Euro 2000 and ticketing arrangements.

At the different seminars, essentially the same subjects were on the agenda. This repetitiveness was necessary for several reasons. At the first seminars, not all relevant countries were represented. Participants changed from one seminar to another and were not always familiar with arrangements from the EU handbook. As the event drew nearer, participants were more often those who would be actually involved in the foreign police teams. And of course, as the event drew nearer, it was possible and necessary to enter into more detail. For countries that did not have fan problems themselves, Euro 2000 only became a reality from the moment their national team had qualified, as the attendance at the seminars indicate (see table below, at the first seminar some countries who would not qualify were also represented).

	October 1998	October 99	February 2000	May 2000
Countries represented (excl hosts)	7	11	14	14
Participants (excl hosts)	16	20	27	44
Participants (host countries)	45	30	51	83

As could be expected, several of the participating countries were non EU-members. The organising countries decided from the start to co-operate with these countries in the same way as with EU-member states. However, the non-EU countries were of course not familiar with the EU handbook and the arrangements in the handbook.

For the host countries it was important that the preparations for international co-operation did not only involve the central level, but also the local level (host cities). Visits abroad did not only serve an information gathering purpose, but also helped to maintain involvement and to establish contacts.

The organised field trips after the final seminar provided an important opportunity for foreign delegation leaders and liaison officers to get to know their working environment for Euro 2000 as well as accompanying officers. This can be considered good practice. In the past (in the months before previous tournaments), these visits were arranged on an ad hoc and individual basis.

Taken together, the formal and informal contacts and arrangements prior to the event seem to have set the scene for a potentially successful international co-operation.

## **6. International police co-operation**

### **6.1 Introduction**

According to the EU handbook, following the preparations, organising authorities and police forces should take into account requirements for the organisation of international police co-operation. Depending on the nature of the support to be provided and the size of the team, a foreign police team could be responsible for the following duties:

- reconnaissance, spotting or escorting duties (operational police officers supervising risk fans from the start of their journey);
- co-ordinating the work of the operational police officers and channelling information (operations co-ordinator);
- exchanging information between participating countries and the host country (liaison officers). In view of the differing expertise involved in the areas of public order, violent football hooliganism and terrorism, the national liaison officer could propose that the host country agree to the stationing of a second liaison officer at the host country's co-ordination centre;

A leader would be functionally and hierarchically in charge of a foreign police team; if however, there is a national police co-ordination centre, the leader is only the liaison's officer hierarchical superior, functional responsibility for the liaison officer then rests with the head of the co-ordination centre. A spokesman may accompany a foreign police team.

The host country should make maximum use of the support that foreign police forces can supply and foreign police support should form part of the host organisation's tactical plan. The host police organisation should ensure the physical safety and adequate accreditation of supporting foreign police officers and provide them with interpreters (if necessary), accompanying police officers, and communications equipment.

Information on the international police co-operation effort was gathered by means of exit interviews with foreign police teams (all but one were interviewed), an evaluation by accompanying officers, answers to checklists filled out by members of spotter teams and ad lib observations and interviews by members of the binational observation teams and the international monitoring team.

### **6.2 The organisation of international police co-operation**

During Euro 2000, two types of support were asked for by the host countries and provided by foreign police. On the one hand, liaison officers were present in the central (binational) police information centre (BPIC, located in Driebergen). On the other hand, spotters' teams travelled through the host countries to follow fans of their country. Both liaison officers and spotters' teams arrived two days before the football team from their country played its first match. The host countries had made it clear beforehand that they wanted the deployment of foreign police teams to generate an undeniable surplus value by means of appropriate operational support. The professional competence of the team members would have to be assured and clear agreement should exist concerning the scope of the duties they are expected to perform. Deployment of the spotters' teams was co-ordinated from the binational police information centre in Driebergen.

During Euro 2000, all participating countries had at least one liaison officer in the BPIC (four countries had two liaison officers). In addition, all participating countries but one had a team of police officers present (minimum 3 officers, maximum 17), headed by a delegation leader. Three countries had an interpreter with them, one a spokesman. In all, 107 police officers

were involved in the foreign police teams (a considerable increase compared with the 43 foreign police officers active during Euro 96; ACPO, 1996). In addition, the Netherlands and Belgium had their own spotters' teams to spot Belgian and Dutch fans. The foreign police teams were each accompanied by one Belgian and one Dutch police officer and (depending on the number of spotters in the team), one or more cicerones as driver and additional accompaniment. In each city in which they were active, one or more local guides assisted the spotters' teams. The different functionalities will be dealt with below.

### ***Liaison officer***

The liaison officer of each country was expected to ensure the information flow between the co-ordinating centre and the home country. He was subject to the functional authority of the head of the co-ordination centre. He worked in close consultation with the delegation leader and the spotters' team. The liaison officer had to be a police officer with preferably experience in the field of treating information procedures at international level, with good communication skills and sufficient status to allow him to consult all relevant sources in his own country. He was expected to be creative in seeking solutions to cater for specific information needs and to find alternative sources of information. The liaison officer was expected to gather, process and deliver high quality and appropriate information. More details about the work of the liaison officers will be given in the next chapter on information management.

### ***Spotter***

In the view of the host countries, a spotter should be able to work in a creative way within the legal framework. Integrity, objectivity and discretion are as important as a tolerant attitude and an ability to take a lot more than the average police officer. A spotter had to refrain from any activities that could jeopardise his credibility or physical integrity or those of his colleagues. The following profile of a spotter was formulated: a police officer who has specialised knowledge of football fans and their habits and customs, especially about the identity, tactics and strategies of risk fans and who provides tactical and operational support in maintaining law and order (primary mission), by gathering and conveying relevant intelligence and by averting, restraining or stopping football-related disasters, and to offer assistance to judicial enquiries by identifying suspects and giving evidence (complementary secondary mission).

Spotters have to be emotionally and physically fit, have a good (trained) visual memory and be interested in football-related maintenance of law and order. Especially important are the necessary interpersonal skills to maintain communication under all circumstances and the social skills to establish, develop and maintain contacts at various social levels.

### ***Operational co-ordinator***

The operational co-ordinator is the spotters' superior and conducts and co-ordinates all the operational missions of the team in the field and ensures operational contacts with the liaison officer at the central co-ordination centre and the local police organisation. He is responsible for the quality of the information and works in close consultation with the delegation leader. The operational co-ordinator is a police officer with preferably a spotter background who sets an example and has the abilities to manage the spotter team within a foreign police culture, who knows about international information structures, has a thorough command of the information procedures employed, of risk analysis techniques and of briefing and debriefing procedures.

### ***Delegation leader***

The delegation leader is expected to direct the foreign police team. The delegation leader is a police officer with experience of international police co-operation who is trained in the field of strategic, tactical and operational techniques, who has the personal qualities to direct the spotter team according to the specific needs, sets an example, shows the necessary operational flexibility under all circumstances, knows the strategic tactical and operational police aspects regarding major events, has the interpersonal skills to communicate and operate in a constructive way within a foreign police culture and structure.

### ***Accompanying officer***

Accompanying officers accompanied a foreign team during the entire tournament. The specific mission of the accompanying officers was to assist the foreign police officers so as to optimise contacts and logistics. Officers were selected (in the Netherlands) or appointed (in Belgium) on the basis of their previous experiences with international police co-operation and their experience with the maintenance of law and order issues. They had to be of sufficient rank to be able to make the necessary contacts at administrative and police level. Language and communication skills as well as a good geographical knowledge were also essential. Previous to the tournament, both Belgian and Dutch accompanying officers received a similar (but not identical) training. Dutch accompanying officers followed a two-day programme that included information about the preparations for Euro 2000, the international police co-operation effort, spotting and evaluation procedures. Belgian accompanying officers followed a separate programme that contained more background information about police preparations for Euro 2000.

### ***Cicerones***

Cicerones and accompanying officers were responsible for the vehicles put at the disposal of the spotters' teams and for the transport of the teams during the entire tournament. Language and communication skills as well as a good geographical knowledge were essential for a proper functioning of cicerones. Cicerones also had to have some familiarity with the operational organisation of football related law and order maintenance.

### ***Guides***

Local guides ensured the operational escort of the foreign police teams during the deployment in a particular city. They were expected to be familiar with the spotters' methodology, with local football-related issues and with the local operational organisation and local geography. They had to be able to communicate with the respective foreign police teams. The preparation of the local guides was the responsibility of the host cities themselves

### ***Logistics***

For the foreign teams (including accompanying officers and cicerones) accommodation was booked in hotels at a quiet location within the immediate surroundings of participating towns. A contract with an international hotel chain made a flexible allocation of accommodation possible. This was a necessity after the first round, when the need to accommodate spotters' teams of dissimilar sizes depended on the results of "their" football teams. The host countries provided a fixed amount (DFL 100 per day) to cover the costs of meals and minor expenses. Vehicles (with maps) were provided to transport the foreign teams, with accompanying officers and cicerones acting as drivers. Host countries provided mobile phones (one per two spotters) and dictaphones to foreign teams. All members of the spotters' teams received full accreditation during the period when the team of their country was still in the tournament. In addition, all foreign police officers received a uniform identification badge,

to be used in combination with the accreditation, as it was considered impossible to familiarise local police and stewards with all relevant foreign police identifications. All members of the spotters' teams received a purple jacket with the word "Police" on the back to be used in the case of an emergency to make recognition by operating police officers possible.

### **6.3 Views of foreign police teams**

There was general agreement among the foreign police teams that the level of international police co-operation was unprecedented. The preparatory visits to the host cities (and for liaison officers to the BPIC) three weeks prior to the start of the tournament, where delegation leaders met with commanding police officers and with accompanying officers, conferred a big advantage. Hospitality, accompaniment, logistical arrangements and equipment provided were without exception evaluated positively. Some teams brought additional equipment (video cameras, looking glasses, and laptop computers). The composition of the foreign teams was considered adequate. A spokesman for a country that draws a lot of media attention was considered an advantage. Accreditation was excellent although on some occasions stewards were unhelpful in allowing access to spotters' in spite of accreditation.

According to the answers to the checklists (119 checklists were completed), members of the spotters' teams were generally satisfied with the international police co-operation (see table below). After Euro 2000, members from spotters' teams generally considered themselves to be well informed about local police preparations in the cities they visited and about their own role there. They felt that conditions for successful international co-operation were met in these cities and that local police made use of their expertise. However, the average scores were somewhat lower compared to the general assessment previous to the tournament (during the last seminar). This difference can be ascribed to the different way in which participating cities made use of spotters' teams. As the range of average scores for the different host cities reveal, there were considerable differences between different cities. Although in theory, the spotters' teams and international police co-operation formed part of the local tactical plan, this was not always true in practice. The international monitoring team came to the same conclusion and observed several occasions when police did not react to intelligence supplied by spotters.

*Views of foreign police teams on international police co-operation*  
Average scores on a scale of 1 (do not agree) to 5 (agree completely)

	Before Euro 2000 (N = 41)	After Euro 2000 (N = 119)	Range
well informed about police preparations?	4,4	3,9	3,0 - 4,5
well informed about role?	4,3	4,1	3,0 - 4,7
conditions for cooperation met?	4,2	3,9	3,3 - 4,8
maximum use of expertise?	4,6	3,9	2,7 - 4,6

These differences between host cities make it possible to identify several elements considered “good practice”. Generally, taking foreign teams seriously and showing respect was one of the most important aspects, which became visible in several ways.

***Communication with the teams***

It was considered good practice by the spotters’ teams when, in communicating with them, a language was used that they could understand. When this proved impossible, assistance of a good interpreter who translated all information was essential. Two-way communication, which included timely and adequate information of foreign teams of relevant events, benefited the co-operation. Adequate briefings and a systematic and structured debriefing afterwards were considered important. For the one team that had its own spokesman, contact between him and the local police spokesman was also considered good practice.

***Local guides***

The assistance of well-prepared and knowledgeable local guides is essential to an effective functioning of the teams. It is important that the guides know their role, know about the local organisation and preparations, have some knowledge of football hooliganism, are able to provide security to the foreign team and have the proper equipment.

***Use of information provided by spotters’ teams***

Not surprisingly, it is considered good practice if the information of the foreign team is actually utilised and the local police have the flexibility to adapt to this information (rather than rigidly sticking to the same procedures, regardless of the information provided)

***Other aspects that facilitated the work of the spotters’ teams were:***

- good functioning fan embassies/ fan coaches at the right locations (not just in the city centre, but also at parkings etc.);
- clear local command and information structures;
- hierarchical structures without unnecessary intermediate links that hindered the flow of information;
- absence of a disruption of activities of the foreign team (e.g. by frequent phone calls, by giving priority to secondary tasks, by an emphasis on hospitality);
- contacts with other spotters’ teams at briefings and in hotels.

The spotters’ teams noted that sometimes confusion could arise between the use of the word “spotter” and “supporter”. They felt the need for more information on fans from other

countries and for a Europe wide database on fans. In addition, they identified several details for improvement:

- provide accompaniment for the spokesman of a spotters' team (if there is a spokesman);
- provide headphones for mobile phones.

#### **6.4 Views on the functioning of the spotters' teams**

There was general agreement that the spotters' teams contributed positively to the policing of Euro 2000. Their observations, analyses, advice and sometimes active involvement with fans were of importance for the successful maintenance of public order. The teams could be deployed in a highly flexible way when and where they were needed. They had a lot of expertise and were able to provide a lot of valuable information. More details about the information aspect will be dealt with in the next chapter on information management.

However, two areas were identified where the use of spotters was not entirely successful. On some occasions, foreign spotters were of limited use when information was needed on the behaviour of migrants: fans originating from participating countries, but living in one of the host countries. Also, differences between the spotters' teams from different countries existed. Not surprisingly, given the different level of football related violence in different countries, not all spotters were as experienced and as knowledgeable about the behaviour of fans or about the arrangements contained in the EU handbook. As the international monitoring team also indicates, some of the spotters did not appear to have the necessary and desirable qualifications (in the sense of appropriate experience and skills) to perform their task. Some were not police officers or had no practical experience in dealing with football fans. Not every team was able to provide the same "products", such as: assessment of the atmosphere, interpretation of fan behaviour, check accuracy of information, supervise fans or make a contribution to crowd control. To avoid misunderstandings and false expectations, in the pre-planning stage more attention is needed for this aspect in the communication with participating countries.

#### **6.5 Conclusions**

The experiences of the previous championships have clearly been put to good use. Extensive preparations set the scene for a successful international co-operation. However, it has to be realised that language differences remain an important obstacle in operational European police co-operation and that every joint effort will have to take account of this aspect.

During Euro 2000, good contacts existed between local police forces and spotters' teams. Also, local police forces on the whole made use of the input provided by the spotters' teams. On most occasions, the respective teams had a clear added value. They identified a large number of potential hooligans, and on occasions when there was no risk their presence allowed them to continuously update the risk assessment to the local police. The international police co-operation was executed as intended and can be said to have the expected effects. Because so much attention was given to preparing for the international police co-operation, the teams were able to concentrate on their task. The work of the teams was not influenced in any important way by unforeseen circumstances. When fans of a country were present in places other than the place of a match, spotters would simply go these places.

However, some teams seemed to have had little added value. This could arise from a limited knowledge and experience concerning football-fans or from the fact that many fans of the

national team concerned live in other countries and were not known to the foreign police teams. The international monitoring team recommends that, in future, only spotters that can provide a distinct added value should be invited. The EU handbook makes this possible. The host countries realised (and accepted) that there would be differences between the contribution of spotters' teams from different countries, but preferred to invite spotters from all participating countries. There were several reasons for this decision. Even a limited contribution can make a difference. Participation in the international co-operation effort by sending spotters increases commitment. It also helps these countries to build experience that would be difficult to build in any other way, and this long-term effect is beneficial in organising future events. Furthermore, exclusion of some countries would run counter to a Europe that is and will be characterised by increasing international police co-operation in many areas. However, more attention is needed in the communication with participating countries about the "products" their team can and will provide

## **7. Information management**

### **7.1 Introduction**

Preparing for Euro 2000, the binational police project recognised the crucial importance of information. The main aim of the international police co-operation effort was to make an information-driven police operation possible. The 1999 European annual report on football vandalism also revealed the major importance of efficient information gathering and the timely passing of information to the police services of the organising country. In the preparations, a lot of attention was paid to the information management. Over two years before the start of Euro 2000, police information needs were identified in great detail (Eindverslag werkgroep informatiebehoefte Euro 2000, februari 1998). These needs did not only involve information directly related to fans, but all other relevant information such as travel, accommodation, media, logistics, threats, VIP-protection etc.

As was indicated in the previous chapter, a lot of trouble was taken by the host countries to organise the international police co-operation well before the start of the tournament. These pre-tournament contacts in the form of visits and conferences were also preparatory to the information management. At an early stage, risk analyses were made and discussed with representatives from participating countries, profiles for liaisons and other members of foreign police delegations were developed and communicated.

Both the activities of the liaison officers (at a central point) and the spotters' teams (at a local level) were aimed at providing information to the host police organisations in line with the information needs identified. According to the EU handbook the police forces of the organising country should ensure that there are no differences in the quality of information available at local and national level. If there are national and local police co-ordination centres (as was the case during Euro 2000), the local and national centres should keep one another informed. This information flow should take into account information provided by the liaison officer from the supporting country. When fans are returning home, the national co-ordination centre in the organising country will inform the police force of the fans' home country, along with the police forces of transit countries, if there is any reason to anticipate trouble.

The police forces of the organising country should ensure that lines of communication and information facilities are clear to supporting foreign police forces, taking into account the nature of information, whether relating to terrorism, individual criminal records (for offenders), public order or violent football hooliganism. The police force of the organising country should make arrangements to channel information received from the foreign police team promptly to the proper authorities within its own police organisation. The police force of the organising country should appoint an information officer to be attached to the support team responsible for reconnaissance or spotting. That officer should serve as a contact for the team leader and be responsible for the proper channelling of information.

Liaison officers in the central co-ordination centre should fulfil a vital role. The police force of the organising country should communicate with the national police forces of the participating countries throughout the championship via the liaison officer appointed and supplied by the country in question. The liaison officer might be approached in the areas of public order, violent football hooliganism and terrorism. The police force of the organising country should shield the liaison officer of the supporting foreign police force from any contact with the media, if the liaison officer so wishes. The liaison officer should be stationed at the national co-ordination centre and be responsible for continually updating the risk

analysis. He should be kept up to date by the police force in his own country about fan behaviour there.

During Euro 2000, there was a clear distinction between information exchange at the local level (in the host cities and in other cities) and at the central level. The backbone of the information structure was the information exchange between a central information centre and local/ regional information centres. Existing information structures and information flows were to be maintained as much as possible. A complicating factor was the existence of two central police information centres, one in Belgium and one in the Netherlands. Both of these police information centres were set up to fulfil a central role in the respective countries. In addition, the police information centre in the Netherlands fulfilled a role for both countries, as all foreign liaisons were located at this Binational Police Information Centre (BPIC).

This chapter focuses on the information exchange between police forces, both at central and local levels. It is investigated whether the information exchange took place as intended and contributed to police operations. Observers were posted at the two central police information points (both the Binational Police Information Centre BPIC in the Netherlands and the mixed intelligence and co-ordination cell GICC in Belgium) and as far as possible in the eight information centres in the host cities (regional police information centres in the Netherlands and local information and co-ordination cells in Belgium). Trying to follow the information streams proved to be difficult. A combination of information carriers (fax, telephone, several computerised message exchange systems, etc.) was used at the information centres. Some information points in the host cities enabled observers to observe systematically, these offered great transparency. In those information points, the observers were able to observe at any time and to ask questions to the actors during calmer moments. Other information points in the host cities were not willing to enable the observers to follow the information procedure at will. The relatively short periods that observers did observe at these points give only a limited view as regards the working of the information exchange and even less with respect to the practical possibilities and the reaction to unforeseen situations or less manageable moments. This is due to the fact that at these information points, observations were mainly carried out during the calm periods. This of course restricts the possibilities for analysis. Interviewing involvees at various levels therefore complemented the observational data.

In all, the analysis is based on the following information:

1. Written overviews of information structures provided by police forces;
2. Information provided by observers: reports, information checklists (whenever possible) and overview of actors, structures and means (whenever possible);
3. Interviews with liaison officers, spotters' teams and members of information centres.

## **7.2 Central information management**

### **7.2.1 Two central police information centres**

Because of the fact that Euro 2000 was organised by two countries, specific measures had to be taken to implement a police information point that would be clearly recognisable to police forces from participating countries. To this purpose, the Binational Police Information centre BPIC was set up. The primary task of the BPIC was to gather, register, analyse and distribute operational police information related to public order and safety prior to, during and immediately following Euro 2000, in so far as this information was relevant for the policing


of Euro 2000. In theory, the BPIC was set up to perform this function for both Belgian and Dutch police forces. To this purpose, all foreign liaisons were stationed at the BPIC and the BPIC was in contact with all eight host cities, both in Belgium and in the Netherlands.

Because, in the Netherlands, a structure to gather and distribute public order and safety information between regional police forces did not exist, the BPIC fulfilled this role for the whole of the Netherlands as far as the information was related to Euro 2000. However, for Belgium, the BPIC fulfilled a different role. Belgium has a national police force, the Gendarmerie, which plays a role in all major public order operations. In Belgium, a structure to gather and distribute public order and safety information between national police units already existed. For matters related to football and Euro 2000, a separate national police information centre (GICC) was put in place during the World Cup '98 in France. The gathering and distribution of relevant information from and to all police units and services within Belgium was the task of the GICC.

In effect, this meant that two central police information centres existed, one in Belgium and one in the Netherlands. For the sake of clarity, the functioning of the BPIC and the GICC will be dealt with separately below. However, the conclusions will focus on matters related to the general principles of central police information management.

**7.2.2 The Binational Police Information Centre**

Being a binational information platform, the BPIC was created to supply mainly strategic and operational information to the other information points through close collaboration with the police services of the participating countries. The BPIC was also in charge of the gathering and the management of tactical information for the Netherlands. The BPIC was composed of liaisons from participating countries and of an equal number of collaborators from both organising countries.



This structure indicates that the BPIC received information from the binational and international police services – the countries taking part in the championship – on the one hand, and from non-police partners such as the Euro 2000 Foundation on the other. At least one liaison officer per participating country was located at the BPIC. He was in communication with his country concerning strategic and operational information that was of an interest for the championship. The official languages in use were Dutch, French and English. The BPIC started work on April 1, 2000 (more than two months prior to the start of the tournament). At the beginning of June (a week before the start of the tournament), the BPIC was complete: foreign liaisons were present and a mixture of Belgian and Dutch collaborators.

Information was provided to the services interested and concerned, both at request and on one's own initiative. The BPIC tried to supply incidental information and intelligence, threat analysis, situation reports, verifications, general information and external messages such as press reviews.

To present the findings more clearly, below a distinction is made between the internal and external functioning of the BPIC as a central point of information. Specific attention will be given to the message system used and to the foreign liaisons.

### ***Internal functioning of BPIC***

The BPIC organisation consisted of four cells for the information processing and four supportive cells. The first four cells were successively made up of the cell foreign liaisons, the cell particular liaisons, the analysis cell and the communication cell. The foreign liaisons were informed by their home country of useful strategic information (travel habits supporters, sojourn etc.) and updated the risk analysis by means of the information gathered. The cell particular liaisons mainly gathered information from particular specific and expert areas. The analysis cell was composed of a number of analysts. Their primary task was to rate information into intelligence by means of evaluation, verification and follow-up. Finally, the communication cell was in charge of the import and export of messages exchanged by any other channel than the computerised message system (FIMEXS). The support services included the secretary, the accreditation management, a logistics service and Information Technology. Co-ordinators were in charge of the daily proceedings. Each morning two briefings were held: one internal briefing and one briefing with foreign liaison officers.

The internal set up of the BPIC did not prove to be ideal. The information had to pass from the communication cell to a co-ordinator to the analysis cell. Situation reports, 3-day follow-up analyses and information about the movement of teams and fans were made and archived by the analysis cell. This involved vast amounts of information in fixed formats, which had to be sent out to other partners at fixed, predetermined intervals. In this, the co-ordinators were involved as well, resulting in a high work-load. The work-load was increased by the fact that (especially in the first few days) a lot of information did not reach the BPIC through the computerised message exchange system, but via fax or telephone or in a different format. A clear distinction between different types of information was not made, which clearly shows in the following example: “the information is too jumbled up: from travel information to criminal investigation information”. In addition, the BPIC received a lot of questions. As a result, only a small part of all information could be analysed or filtered with regard to usefulness. Most of the time, the analysts had to restrict themselves to joining, summarising and classifying the information, rather than analysing it, and information often had to be distributed “as a rough draft”.

The skills needed for an operationally useful analysis of dynamic public order information proved to be scarce. Training had been given beforehand, but at a relatively late stage. The training focused more on group processes than on public order analysis. Finally, the setting up and the plan of operations of the BPIC appeared to be unfeasible for some and too fleshed out for others. As a result, a number of structural adjustments had to be made during the course of the tournament, such as the appointment of an adjunct co-ordinator.

In the course of an event as big as Euro 2000, it is unpredictable how many messages will be sent and received (and will have to be translated). This calls for built-in flexibility in the number of collaborators needed and their planning. The number of collaborators should not be too tight, at busy times extra capacity should be available. The social aspect is also important. A dedicated planner is useful in this respect, to prevent the head of the information centre from having to spend a lot of his time making and changing personnel plans. Ready support for logistics and information technology is essential for smooth operations within the information centre.

A problem involved in information management during an event lasting several days or weeks proved to be that of continuity and transfer of information between different collaborators working in an information centre. After a while, people at key positions (co-ordinators) will start to miss information. There is no easy solution, because it is also important that people are well rested, but the problem may be lessened by not allowing days off and by giving every information analyst his own domain.

A number of visitors (authorities, politicians, journalists, and foreign police) took an interest in what was going on inside the centre. Attending to these visitors took up a lot of time. Wisely, someone was appointed full-time to organise visits and accompany visitors and decisions concerning who will and who will not be received were made beforehand. The BPIC organised a press-conference before the start of the tournament, which included a visit to the information centre itself. At a later stage, one camera crew was allowed to film the work inside the information centre. This was considered beneficial.

### ***FIMEXS***

For the information management of Euro 2000 the need was felt for a system that enabled to:

- make visible which partners and collaborators were active at any given time;
- make visible whether messages were actually read by the receiver;
- make visible whether or not deadlines were passed;
- monitor the progress of messages;
- prioritise messages;
- find and retrieve text easily.

During Euro 96, the exchange of information between the national co-ordinating centre and the local police command centre took place through the already existing Epi-centre system, while separate systems were used for the electronic transmission of images and criminal intelligence. Epi-centre has limited search and retrieval facilities, did not provide the required facilities mentioned above and for Euro 2000, this system was considered to be inadequate. At the World Cup '98 in France, faxes were used for the exchange of information between the central co-ordination post and local information centres. This was considered to be even less adequate. The existing national system in use at the Belgian Gendarmerie (Commence) also did not possess the required functionality. In the Netherlands, a national system for the exchange of public order related information did (and does) not exist.

Therefore, a software system (FIMEXS) was developed to be used specifically for the information management of Euro 2000. Within FIMEXS, every step in the information process, including date time, action taken and identity of actor, was registered. The information cycle was monitored in two ways: both the content of the messages and the process were monitored.

In the Netherlands, where the BPIC also fulfilled a role as national co-ordination centre, all Dutch police forces were part of the system. Data was transferred over the already existing secure, dedicated police communication lines. However, data between the Belgian information centres and the BPIC had to pass through regular ISDN-lines, which led to a much slower performance (relative to the performance within the Netherlands).

For several reasons, the FIMEXS system was available at a late stage. As a consequence, it could not be tested thoroughly before the start of the tournament and users had little time to get acquainted with the system. Although users, including foreign liaisons, were trained on the system, it took some time before everyone actually used the system. For some police forces, use was only made of the system after the BPIC sent out a collaborator. In one police force, the system was never used. Sometimes, use of the system was dependent on only one person. As a result, especially in the beginning, frequent use was made of faxes. During Euro 2000, some 10.000 messages (with multiple recipients, on average 4) were exchanged over the FIMEXS system. The functionality of the system was as expected, the performance was not always as good: sometimes it was too slow.

### *Foreign liaisons*

All participating countries had at least one liaison officer within the BPIC during Euro 2000, where English was the working language (one liaison was accompanied by an interpreter). The task of foreign liaisons was to provide a continuous risk analysis of fans originating from “their” country, as well as providing information about the travel and stay of fans and their backgrounds. Their primary focus was on public order, including acts of violence by football fans. However, the liaisons could also be asked to provide judicial information and information on terrorism.

Before coming to the BPIC, the liaison officer was expected to make a first analysis. During his time at the BPIC, he should continuously update this analysis and be in touch with his country to be informed about the expected activities of fans. He checked the analyses made by the analysts in the BPIC in so far as these related to fans from his home country. The liaison officer also maintained contact with the team of spotters from his home country and with embassies of his home country.

At the conference in May, all liaison officers were invited and present. Following the conference, all liaison officers paid a (three-day) visit to the BPIC. During this visit, arrangements were made for the actual functioning during Euro 2000, information was given about the way in which the BPIC would be operating, information was exchanged related to possible threats and a training was given on the FIMEXS system. Between this visit and the start of the tournament, there were frequent contacts between the liaisons and the BPIC. On arriving at the BPIC in the beginning of June (3 days before the first match of their country), the liaisons had a lot of information with them. This led to an information overload. It would have been better if this information had been provided earlier or if the liaisons had arrived earlier.

There were differences between the different liaisons, dependent on experience and workload. There were more reactive and more pro-active liaisons. Pro-active liaisons were able to anticipate information needs. It proved important for liaisons to be used to working in an information- management function and to have access to relevant partners in their own countries. It is also important that they know the working language well. Daily briefings with all liaison officers proved to be beneficial. They also enhanced the team spirit and mutual interaction. For countries with a large number of high risk fans or an important transit function, the availability of just one liaison proved to be insufficient.

Early arrival of liaisons and daily briefings with all liaison officers present can be seen as good practice as is an early comparison of risk analysis made by the host countries with those of participating countries.

### ***External functioning of BPIC***

The BPIC had many external partners. To be able to function properly, the BPIC was completely dependent on the information it received from its partners. When partners did not deliver the necessary information (as was frequently the case), this had a direct influence on the quality of information provided by the BPIC. Especially many non-police services provided less information than expected. Also, some local police information points did not open the information sent to them or read it after a long delay. It took some time before other local information points provided Euro 2000 relevant information. One local information point never provided any information at all. During Euro 2000, BPIC received only 2 (out of 31 matches) of the “match reports” agreed upon beforehand whereas 61% of situation reports did not arrive. Receiving feed-back or confirmations on messages often proved difficult as well. This made it difficult for the BPIC to fulfil its role properly. Added to this were the start-up problems mentioned above and the problem of getting used to the FIMEXS system.

All this meant that it took some time before the BPIC could meet the expectations of its external partners. A week after the start of the tournament, the BPIC called on its partners to limit the sending of faxes as much as possible (and use FIMEXS instead), to send relevant messages directly to relevant partners (and not just to the BPIC, expecting the BPIC to take care of it) and to send the information agreed upon, using the format agreed upon. Eventually, especially with regard to the local information centres in the Netherlands, the BPIC was able to fulfil its central role by giving overviews, pointing out “strange events” (e.g. information about lots of fans but no transport) and checking on the completeness of the information exchange (was no one forgotten).

Apart from these start-up problems, it became clear that differences existed between what “customers” expected and what the BPIC could deliver. Several reasons may be responsible for this discrepancy. In the preparatory phase, there is a clear need for unambiguous arrangements as to what different partners should expect from one another. Also, expectations of customers seemed to change over time. And no doubt, there were differences between the expectations of different customers and a deviation from protocols agreed upon. The different information needs of different partners/ customers certainly played a role: different police forces in the Netherlands needed different information, authorities needed other information than police forces and there were differences between the information needed in Belgium and in the Netherlands.

While it is important to make a clear distinction between detailed, operational police information and more general information needed by authorities, in practice these two types


of information intermingled. Authorities tended to ask for specific information, especially at times when there was little information available. This certainly resulted in an added work load at the BPIC and local information centres. An unfortunate consequence was also that on occasion operational police information (in the form of unanalysed assessments of a situation) led to decisions with far reaching consequences (e.g. to arrange transport for fans that did not make use of the transport).

For many spotters' teams, the BPIC did not live up to their expectations. For the most part, this was due to the fact that the teams did not receive feed-back on their information, received answers to their questions only after a long delay or considered the information received to be too superficial. Others had the feeling the information they provided was not used or relayed to the host cities. Some foreign teams indicated that they would have liked to receive the full daily reports sent out by the BPIC to the host cities, rather than just the details relevant to fans of their national team. Both parties considered contacts between foreign teams and their liaison officers at the BPIC adequate.

In spite of these limitations, the BPIC managed to fulfil a vital role in the exchange of information during Euro 2000, increasingly so during the tournament.

**7.2.3 The mixed intelligence and co-ordination cell GICC in Belgium**

The structure of the mixed intelligence and co-ordination cell was not new. The Belgian Ministry of Home Affairs, General Secretariat for General State Police, already created it as a result of the world championship football in France. It concerned both regular Belgian police services of administrative police. This existing structure was maintained and extended according to the situation and the needs that ensued from the EURO 2000 preparations.



The circulation of non-police information at policy level occurred on the binational level, through the BIP (Binational Information Platform). The GICC also worked directly with the management cell in the lap of the Crisis Centre of the Belgian government (the CGCCR). The exchange of police information between the Belgian police services and the BPIC occurred on the binational level through the GICC. This could either be direct, or parallel when the host cities themselves were direct addressees or senders.

At a national level, the GICC acted as co-ordination, analysis and distribution centre within Belgium with a view to the rapid exchange and analysis of administrative information and the distribution of necessary directives and decisions. As regards operational and tactical information, the GICC closely collaborated with the existing national structure of DOCC (Department of Operations of the Gendarmerie) through the exchange of liaison officers. The GICC also closely collaborated with other partners, again through liaison officers (airplane, boat and train travel). The local information and co-ordination centres were organised with analogous structure and conception in the host cities as well as in non-host cities through a number of “Geographically Strategic cities or areas”. A Regional Information point was created in these cities or areas. Within this structure, the GICC had neither national policy competence nor central decision competence as regards the information itself. It firstly acted on behalf of the information management of all national police units.

The GICC permanently (24 hours a day) gathered, registered, analysed and distributed operational information. The prevailing and urgent information was mainly gathered and distributed by the duty service. They mostly used the national computerised Commence system. They also used fax and telephone. The duty co-ordinator received all information on paper for evaluation and processing.

According to the observations, the system of one co-ordinator and various call-takers that was applied enabled fluid information processing and distribution. The message flow was never inconvenient, except on the day before and the day of the risk match in Charleroi. On these days the message flow was considerable and often occur in double or triple. Observations revealed that, because of this, the immediate processing of incoming information unavoidably fell behind. On other busy days no delay in the information processing was noted. Still, note that the information flow in Belgium through the GICC had to be carried out in both national languages (Dutch and French). The investment in translation therefore continuously caused a need for additional time investment.

The information flow from and to the spotters and cicerones occurred directly or through the various local information points. This was mostly done by telephone. One person was permanently present at the GICC to receive, claim, evaluate and distribute this information. A person knowledgeable about ticketing arrangements was also present on a permanent basis to supply information as regards the “tickets” (aspect, recognition of false tickets, etc.). The person in charge of accreditation at the GICC could be reached before, during and after the matches. Moreover, one person for accreditation was decentralised per host city. The police officer in charge of accreditation in Brussels was present every day at the GICC as a liaison.

The traffic programme processed all the information and problems, in collaboration with a number of partners, to wit: SPN (Maritime police department), in charge of maritime transport; SPC (Railway police department), in charge of railway transport; VDNL (Gendarmerie detachment national airport), in charge of air traffic and the National traffic dispatching, in charge of road traffic. Liaisons allowed establishing the necessary contacts

with the authorities in charge with a view to punctual interventions. This programme gathered a great deal of the information concerning the number of supporters and their travel.

A number of analysts processed all information arriving at the GICC. They analysed strategic information by means of counts (number of supporters, their travel, time of arrival, possible place of sojourn, etc.) to draw up a kind of barometer with an updated threat analysis of risk groups.

A permanent information exchange was developed through this GICC structure, involving every national and binational service concerned. As such, the GICC was the central point for Belgium where the information concerning and influencing the event of EURO 2000 was gathered, evaluated and finally processed and distributed. Analysts daily processed all of the information gathered. A daily situation report was then made up, covering a period of – 24 hours and + 48 hours. Each day at 07.30 a.m., a briefing with all persons in charge was organised. This was done in collaboration with the persons in charge of the operational work at the Department of Operations (DOCC). One of the topics at these daily briefings was the situation report and the period of – 24 hours and + 48 hours. This report was then put at the disposal of the other information centres. The direct connection by means of video conferencing, mainly with the government crisis cell and the four host cities, enabled the mutual agreement on punctual information and policy options.

The better part of the information flow was processed and exchanged through the computerised Commence system, which was available in the various Belgian information centres. Smaller units that did not have the Commence system used Teamware. These computerised systems offered the advantage that an exchange between several partners was possible in a fast manner and that the information exchanged was permanently recorded to enable subsequent evaluation and verification.

During the championship, the observer noted a number of times that the computerised system Commence had some demerits. Some PC's were slower within the Commence network itself. The system did not allow viewing the addressees of the incoming messages, which sometimes led to double reporting. The observer noted an example of this situation in his report of the day before the risk match at Charleroi. Compared to the other days, the frequency of reporting as regards supporters movement appeared to be immense. The observer states that some messages were sent double or even in triple. Nor did the system allow acquainting the sender of a message with the actual reception of the message.

The information flow itself was daily observed for several moments at the GICC duty. The observation reports revealed that the information flow was smooth and direct. The co-ordinator always evaluated the information before distribution. Note that the information was already evaluated by a different source when the GICC was not the first addressee. The information was generally not verified again except when the co-ordinator thought the source or content was uncertain.

The information exchange with the BPIC mainly concerned strategic information as regards supporters movements. The functioning of the BPIC as a binational platform having a different finality than the GICC sometimes disabled the BPIC of fulfilling the complementary role with respect to the GICC. The BPIC mostly represented one of the possible external collaboration partners of the GICC whereas conversely the GICC was more of a national address point for Belgium.

### **7.3 Local information management**

Local information points were created in the host cities (and both in the Netherlands and Belgium in other cities as well) during the championship. These information points exchanged information directly with one another as well as with the central level. In the preparatory phase in each of the host countries meetings between information officers were held.

The work in the local information points was aimed mainly at the internal organisation surrounding the various matches but, secondly, also at the organisation of the event as a whole. The information exchange was developed to enable permanent information exchange, in favour of both the local information management and for the benefit of the other (national and binational) partners. In some exceptional cases, this secondary orientation appeared as good as non-existent. The binational efforts as regards risk analysis, situation reports and other messages were considered unreliable by a number of local information points. They were only used by these points at a later stage. An area of growth in this context is undoubtedly that clear and binding agreements need to be made beforehand between the different partners as regards expectations and concrete realisation of the information need and the supply of intelligence to one another.

The available information also revealed the functionality of internal computerised communication systems - as regards smoothness and uniformity - as well as with respect to the elaboration of a network for additional local information supply by means of cameras. Still, the computerised communication systems used (FIMEXS and Commence) did not work completely trouble-free. Therefore manual systems often had to be called in, causing a waste of time and inconvenience (double messaging). Closely related to the aforementioned, the workability of information structures and means revealed the need to mainly deploy experienced and trained personnel in the information centres. The working was previously tested on both functioning and means in a number of local information centres. The information exchange was then quasi trouble-free during the whole event. In places where no tests had been done in advance, the first match was often considered a test and modifications were made afterwards. In this respect, several local information points carried out noticeable changes in information exchange during the course of the championship.

In the places where the co-ordination of local information was done centrally by a chief of information or a person in charge, it appeared that the information that was sent through was generally up-to-date and verified. In a number of host cities, the information gathering was preceded each day by a briefing and followed by a debriefing, which facilitated this updating of information.

An area of growth at this level is the functionality of a clear splitting up of the information point and the command centre. In some host cities, the local information point was housed in the same premises as the various commanders or it was split up into different information points. This led to overcrowding of the premises, unmanageable information structures and inconvenient working (who does what?). In the host cities where this was the case, the access was generally not consistently restricted and all types of visitors could be observed. At times, this compromised the information exchange.

On the local level, like on national and binational level, information "satiation" occurred, that somewhat slowed down or even hampered the processing of useful information. That is why a smooth system should be developed to systematically check the reliability of the content as well as the message source and, finally, to follow the distribution towards the persons

concerned. Less problems of information overload or late processing of the information arose in the local information centres where an information control system was built in and relevant information was checked. A smooth and useful system to follow the distribution of relevant data is necessary in the future.

The available data revealed that the spotters' teams had a contribution that should not be underrated in the local supply of operational and strategic information as regards supporter groups and their movements. On several occasions, information provided by spotters' teams made preventive police action possible by which potential problems could be avoided. As indicated in chapter 6, there were differences in the working of different international teams, especially with respect to co-ordination and information supply. The available data reveal that the information supply on the field mainly comprised situation reports, supporter movements and sometimes threat analysis. This information was smoothly processed. In some host cities, the information was directly checked at the information point by means of the international contacts. Still, the verification or request for verification of incoming messages was not always automatic and smooth.

From their perspective, foreign police teams were generally very positive about their co-operation with the host countries. Everything was well organised. The teams felt respected and trusted, and had the impression that their information was acted upon. As indicated in the previous chapter, the teams did note differences in the way they were used in different host cities. Also, teams had the impression not all host cities passed on information provided by the spotters' teams to the BPIC. Mobile phones were most often used as a means of communication by the spotters' teams and they were very important for a good contact with the local information centres (one team preferred to use its own communication system). A headphone would have been preferred, to be able to listen to the phone in often noisy surroundings. Because internationally, information systems were not linked, finding and checking certain types of information (e.g. on identity of fans) was not always easy.

Summarising the findings, the following can be considered "good practice" as far as information management at a local level is concerned:

- there is an information centre that functions as central point for all relevant information for both internal and external partners;
- at any stage information can be received, verified, analysed and distributed;
- there are no internal barriers to fulfil this role;
- information is always evaluated (which implies that it is tested for the reliability of both the contents and the source);
- information is always checked (unless indicated otherwise);
- there is an awareness of mutual interdependence with other partners;
- the information need is defined beforehand;
- an inventory of potential sources of information is made beforehand;
- a clear distinction is made between strategic, tactical and operational information and administrative information;
- information carriers are developed or known beforehand;
- information procedures are written down beforehand;
- personnel is well acquainted with local policies;
- risk analyses are continuously updated;
- use is made of information provided by foreign spotters' teams;
- daily briefings and debriefings.

## 7.4 Conclusions

As indicated in the previous chapters, the preparations as regards information management implied a large degree of international collaboration. This collaboration aimed at establishing direct information channels of the host countries with all police services of each participating country through liaisons at one central police information point. The necessary contacts were made and maintained during the preparation of the event by means of regular international meetings and through visits in each participating country's homeland. For each nation, a team was composed of spotters, a guide and a liaison to gather, register, analyse and distribute strategic and operational information to the benefit of the local organisation of the championship at operational and tactical level. This preparation led to the effective creation of one team per nation and the establishment of liaisons in the BPIC, who were able to fulfil an important role in the exchange of information. The objective of creating a binational information platform in addition to the national and local management of events and including international collaboration, was realised completely and in time. This can be called a success. The information management followed the expectations as concerns the collaboration and information exchange during the championship. The information exchange was carried out with the same openness and with the deployment of a maximum of means, as foreseen and reported during the preparation. It appeared that these partners "automatically" carried out the risk analysis and the information exchange during the preparation. The countries that had less experience in the collaboration and information exchange procedures did not really cause a rift in the assumed working.

However, for the purpose of the event, an information network was set up making use of, but other than, the already existing and institutionalised information contacts ensuing from experiences with international football matches. Obviously, the exchange of information between different police services is rendered more difficult if there is little structured exchange of information in daily practice and when there are language barriers. In addition, the structure and composition of a co-ordinating information platform is hampered by the "unfamiliarity with" and lack of experience in the event management of such scope. In view of the fact that international football matches are regularly recurring events, more permanent structures need to be developed. This may also reduce problems arising from different levels of experience, cultural differences, etc. In information management, it is important to make as much use as possible of existing structures and to build new help- structures only if and when they have a positive added value. Involvement of other (non-police) parties and liaisons in the information structures considerably speeds up exchange of information.

At a technical level, a dedicated software message system was developed. This software system was essential to the efficient handling and monitoring of a large number of messages. Nevertheless, there were shortcomings in the use of the system, due in part to technical shortcomings and a late set-up. The system was not always used as intended. The information exchange was supposed to be direct between the BPIC and the host cities (parallel with GICC for Belgium) by means of this FIMEXS system. This was not automatic at the beginning, yet it evolved positively throughout the course of the championship. Barring exceptions, this direct contact was then made from each information point on initiative and no longer merely at request.

The working of a centralised and almost uniformed Belgian information structure of the police services as opposed to the regional information structures in the Netherlands too created a difference of interests when creating the BPIC. Especially for Belgium, this body

involved a parallel information partner at strategic level. After all, the GICC had a number of settled foreign liaisons and partners (Germany, Luxembourg, France and Great Britain) on the spot and externally. These supplied strategic and operational information. For Belgium, the co-operation with the BPIC rather meant collaboration between both organisers with cross-border information exchange. Still, the BPIC was the national co-ordinator for the Dutch regions as that structure did not exist before that, and no longer exists now. The need for such a national co-ordinating information structure was greater in the Netherlands for the benefit of the organisation of an event of such proportions. An example, the BPIC also managed tactical information in favour of the Dutch host cities and the other regions.

The need for the creation of a “central” police information platform when organising an event of such scope was obvious. In Belgium, such a central structure already existed, in the Netherlands it had to be created. The factor of “unfamiliarity” and the lack of experience implies a particular deployment of numbers and types of persons and means and a need for practical exercises. A few exercises were held which partially met this objective, to wit as regards the foreseen capacity. It is good practice to activate a central body a good length of time before the start of the event (as was the case). Well before the start of Euro 2000, clear information needs were identified. These information needs served as the basis for the information management and, when all information needs had been adequately fulfilled, an information-driven police operation would have been possible (depending on the flexibility of the police forces concerned to act upon the information, see Chapter 10). As it was, due to several circumstances, information needs were not completely fulfilled and operationally, the principles of an intelligence led operation were not always adhered to. We have witnessed instances where police officers ignored information, didn’t know how to deal with it or didn’t get the information they needed.

In the course of this chapter, several instances of good practice and areas for growth have been identified, both at a local level and at a central level. On an international level it would be beneficial to have fixed information points in every country to facilitate exchange of information not just during events, but also in between events. These events do not include only championships, but also the many international matches by club teams and national teams as well. The preparation and evaluation surrounding these events could be much enhanced in this way. Experiences could be gained and exchanged more easily, continuous risk analyses would become possible. A good software system to exchange messages, based on the functionality of the FIMEXS system, could facilitate this development.

Any central information platform is completely dependent on the information it receives, both quantitatively as well as qualitatively. There exists a clear need to define precisely and concretely the *type* of information platform a central information point should be, taking into account differences between strategic and operational information. Clear and unambiguous arrangements have to be made well in advance, and these arrangements need to be adhered to. Specific expertise in public order analysis needs be developed urgently. Training and exchange of experiences regarding public order analysis and risk analysis is crucial to be able to achieve a truly information-driven police operation. In addition, it should be taken into account that public order information is very dynamic: it changes constantly, a lot of information becomes available at a late stage and information cannot easily be transferred from one event to another. E.g. there is no such thing as “the” travel behaviour of certain groups of fans. Therefore, improving information management should go hand in hand with increased flexibility in public order management.

## **8. Co-operation between police forces and stewards**

### **8.1 Introduction**

In addition to dealing with co-operation between police forces from different countries, the EU handbook also deals with the co-operation between police and (foreign) stewards. Organising authorities and police forces should bring in those supervising fans from participating football associations to assist in the job to be done and establish maximum co-operation with them. The handbook states that police forces and stewards' organisations should work together on a complementary basis, without prejudice to each side's own responsibilities and tasks. Police forces should ensure that any information from the stewards' organisation is channelled to the proper police authorities in the organising country and that senior officials from the stewards' organisation have the information needed to carry out their tasks. In addition, the police forces of the supporting country should maintain contact with senior officials responsible for stewards from their country who are providing support to the organising country.

In this chapter, attention will be focused on the co-operation on the sites between the police of the host countries and the stewarding of the event. To this purpose, observations were made by the binational evaluation teams in each city and by the international monitoring team. In addition, interviews were held with the Euro 2000 security manager, with security managers of several stadiums and with several police officers responsible for contacts with the security managers. Also answers to questionnaires filled out by stewards and police officers were used.

### **8.2 Guidance of foreign fans**

In view of the scale of the event and in line with the EU handbook, the host countries considered it advisable for participating countries to send their own supporter escorts (see Information package by host countries). In fact, seven participating countries sent stewards with their fans. However, these foreign stewards only supervised fans that were travelling in an organised manner, and only during their travel (and not during their stay in the host countries or in the stadiums). This decision was made by the Euro 2000 organisation so as not to create confusion between different types of stewards/ fan supervisors inside the sites. Considering their limited role, no information was gathered from foreign stewards.

However, there are benefits to having people around in the cities who speak the supporters' language, who are able to inform fans who are travelling on their own effectively and who are able to pierce the anonymity of potential troublemakers. To this purpose, the host countries recruited fan co-ordinators from fan organisations in the participating countries. Several countries were able to send fan co-ordinators. They received a short training from the host countries immediately before the start of Euro 2000. So-called "pilots" (experienced fan co-ordinators) from the host countries provided support to the foreign fan co-ordinators and served as liaison between fan co-ordinators and the host governments. To prevent fans perceiving them as an extension of the police, fan co-ordinators did not wish to be in direct contact with the police. In each host city, fan embassies were established as a service to fans. These embassies were manned by fan co-ordinators and served as points of information and assistance as well as meeting points. For this investigation, no information was gathered on the functioning of fan co-ordinators and other fan escorts, as they did not fulfil a role on the sites. Also, their role was filled in at a late stage and they did not co-operate directly with police. However, it is important to note that a lot of efforts were made to be able to inform

foreign fans and to monitor their behaviour. In some cities “city stewards” were used in addition to fan co-ordinators to inform fans. In other cities, members from migrant communities accompanied police officers patrolling the streets, both of which may be considered good practice.

### **8.3 Site security management**

As the organiser of Euro 2000 was responsible for the safety on the site, it was necessary for police forces and the safety organisations concerned to work together on a complementary basis. As has become the custom, the safety organisation used selected and trained stewards to supervise fans inside and directly outside the stadium (but within the “site”). The stewards’ primary task was to receive and supervise supporters. Their tasks included checking of entrance tickets, searches on clothing and baggage, requesting surrender of potentially dangerous items, escorting supporters to their seats, providing them with information and supervising compliance with regulations within stadiums. A draft recommendation by the Council of Europe provides a framework for the proper deployment of stewards. In Belgium, stewards’ tasks are defined by the Football Matches Act of 21 December 1998. In the Netherlands, checks on clothing and baggage by stewards are based on the relationship under civil law entered into with the organiser (general conditions for ticket sales).

In half of the stadiums in which matches were played a local security manager was appointed and stewards were selected and trained specifically for the event. In the other stadiums, use could be made of an already existing security organisation, including a local security manager and experienced stewards. In these stadiums, the security manager made use of private security companies to provide back up to stewards. Their precise role might differ from one stadium to another, but their main job usually was to take over any visitors causing trouble from the stewards. In additions, most stadiums used volunteers to assist the stewards in checking tickets, informing fans or pointing out their seats to them. Sometimes, the exact role of these volunteers was not clear and expectations of the security manager and the volunteers themselves seemed to differ.

At most sites a division was made between different rings or perimeters. As a visitor, one would first have to pass a barrier well away from the entrance to the stadium. At this barrier, stewards or volunteers would make cursory ticket checks and any visible “forbidden” items (bottles, sticks, etc.) would be confiscated. Before entering the stadium compound, a second barrier (often with turnstiles) would have to be passed. At this barrier tickets were checked more thoroughly and visitors were searched. On entrance to the stadium, a visitor would have to show his ticket again and be pointed to his designated seat. Throughout the match, a number of stewards supervised fans within the stadium.

### **8.4 Co-operation between police and stewards**

Police fulfilled a supportive role within sites and served as back up. In stadiums where the security organisation made use of a private security company, the number of police officers present within the site was less than in other stadiums. In principle, the decision could have been made not to have any police within sites at all. This would have been consistent with a clear division of responsibilities. The reasons for maintaining a (limited) police presence at sites were that, in this way, police officers were able to provide adequate back up for stewards, volunteers and security personnel, giving them a feeling of security. Also, spectators from many countries were considered to be used to a visible police presence inside stadiums. They could get the wrong message if no police would have been present at all. By

being present, albeit in a limited way, police would be able to make their own observations, to better feel the atmosphere and to advise and support the organiser more quickly. On some occasions, the number of police officers present exceeded the number agreed upon beforehand. This was due to the fact that sometimes police officers without proper accreditation entered the stadium on their own initiative (in order to see the match), in spite of the fact that they had no task there. Stewards would or could not get them to leave. On the other hand, in some stadiums, stewards refused entry to the stadium to (fully accredited) foreign police teams that did have a task to perform.

In general, both stewards and police officers deployed at the sites were highly satisfied with their co-operation. Both parties agreed on the fact that the division of tasks between them was clear, and that in general, all necessary information passed between them. Characteristically, both police officers and stewards felt that the flow of information was somewhat better from them than towards them. Stewards felt they received adequate back up from police and private security companies. Stewards rarely felt the need to call in assistance from either the police or private security personnel, which is in line with the very small number of incidents reported.

Incidents that did occur related to entry to the site and searches being performed. Fans turned up whose tickets were stolen or whose tickets turned out to be false. The policy about what fans could and could not take into the stadium (e.g. photo cameras) caused some discussions. Language differences in the absence of sufficient interpreters sometimes led to more extensive discussions. Public order was threatened only once when a group of about 200 fans tried to storm an outer-barrier entrance, which was dealt with by police.

Inside the site there was the highly publicised incident that led to the arrest of several Italian journalists. Smaller incidents included a limited number of cases where fireworks were ignited inside the stadium and two cases where a fan managed to enter the playing field.

## **8.5 Conclusions**

During Euro 2000, extensive use was made of stewards and (just as was the case for the World Cup in France) this proved to be an excellent choice and can be considered good practice. As the international team also observed, the quality of stewarding was high and stewards adequately fulfilled their tasks. There was generally a clear division of responsibilities and a clear understanding of the distinction between law and order and safety. Several examples of good short and efficient intervention by stewards were witnessed. In all cities police forces and steward organisations worked together on a complementary basis. Police forces worked with senior officials from steward organisations who had the information they needed to carry out their tasks. Professionalism of stadium security managers enhanced this co-operation. Being able to communicate with fans in their own language was a clear bonus, and the use of interpreters can be considered good practice.

A clear distinction could be made between stadiums that were the home of a club and that were familiar with large attendances and those that were not. Wherever there were full time managers and experienced stewards at stadium clubs, procedures were visibly tried and tested and the quality of stewarding was higher. In addition to stewards, both private security companies and volunteers fulfilled a role within sites. The use of volunteers was positive, but there were differences in the way in which they were used. Sometimes they were inappropriately used in first line cordons, and fulfilled de facto crowd control duties. In some stadiums use was made of security companies: on several occasions security personnel was

seen to be rigid and inflexible. In stadiums that did make use of security companies, police presence was visibly lower.

Based on the assumption that participating countries will be (and are encouraged to) sending their own supporter escorts, the EU handbook also deals with the co-operation between police and these stewards. As it turned out, there was a very limited role for foreign stewards, and none at all on the sites. This is of course a legitimate choice of the organiser. In future, similar choices by other organisers may be anticipated. As there was no deployment of foreign stewards on the sites, there was no co-operation between the police and foreign stewards. The co-operation between the local stewards and the police was extensive (and in line with the spirit of the EU handbook). As hardly any incidents or unforeseen circumstances occurred, the co-operation between police and stewards seems to have had the expected effects. The use of stewards is therefore to be encouraged.

In the cities, several others played a role in escorting fans and foreign visitors. Foreign fan co-ordinators, city stewards and others played a prominent role in escorting and informing fans in the cities, but not inside the stadiums. Their relation with the police is a point of discussion.

There is an increasing trend to make the organiser of an event responsible for security matters on the site at which the event is taking place. In allowing the event to take place, authorities impose conditions on the way in which security is handled on the site. This means that the role of the police is reduced and is complementary to the measures taken by the organiser. The establishment of perimeters around the stadium takes this a step further: public space is (temporarily) turned into private space. On some occasions, the use of security companies further blurred the distinction between the maintenance of public and private order.

Within the EU, football related matters are dealt with mainly in the police working group. The EU handbook deals with police co-operation. In the Council of Europe, safety surrounding football matches is dealt with mainly from a sports' angle. Stewarding has developed considerably over the last few years, and important lessons are in the process of being codified within the Council of Europe (as evidenced by the draft recommendation on stewarding). For the EU it might be wise to complement the police co-operation angle with other relevant angles and to take account of the role of fan co-ordinators and others involved in the guidance of foreign supporters.

## **9. Comments and recommendations in relation to the EU Handbook**

### **9.1 Introduction**

By adopting the handbook, the Council of the European Union requested Member States to step up co-operation, in particular practical co-operation between police forces, in order to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches. The contents of the EU handbook, based as they are on experiences gained during previous championships have proven to be very valuable in the international police co-operation effort during Euro 2000. The fact that the handbook exists, has been adopted by EU countries and has been used explicitly, has undoubtedly made an important contribution to the maintenance of public order during Euro 2000. The evaluation has identified some areas for improvement or clarification, which will be dealt with below in more detail. Before doing that, some general comments can be made.

It has become clear that public order problems during a championship do not only involve the traditional hooligans travelling from one country to another. Other individuals or groups may cause or become involved in public order incidents as well. This is true for the local population in any participating country. On the other hand, migrant groups may become involved. The subdivision of individuals into categories (such as A, B and C fans) seems to become less meaningful as relatively more people not belonging to the highest risk category become involved in incidents. Risk analyses and preventive measures will have to take this into account. This also means that the international police co-operation in relation to international football matches is not just about sending police teams to the organising country. Preventive measures and information gathering within all participating countries are essential. In addition, police measures alone cannot prevent and control public order disturbances. It is therefore necessary to merge the policing initiatives with the initiatives taken from a sports' and social preventive perspective (and e.g. encourage the use of experienced fan co-ordinators and of fan-embassies). It is also important for host countries to take care of a consistent approach of fans, based on good communication with fans, quick transfers and good signages.

It has also become clear that the need for international police co-operation does not end after a tournament. Every year and every month, international matches between club teams and between national teams take place all over Europe. Potential risks continue. It would be wise to make the international gathering and exchange of information, as well as the analyses of the risks involved, a continuous process. The quality of the risk analyses needs to be enhanced. Each country has something to contribute to the build-up of experiences and the continuous gathering of relevant information.

It is also clear that legal aspects are important. The EU handbook is not the place to deal with these aspects which include exchange of data, border controls and the international application of stadium bans. Participating countries should do all in their legal power to contain and influence potential troublemakers in their own country

International football matches and tournaments in Europe also involve non-EU countries, including candidate member states and members of the Council of Europe. Although these countries clearly had less experience with international police co-operation along the lines of the EU handbook, they showed their willingness to become involved. It would be beneficial to make similar arrangements with these countries as well.

The project Police Expertise Euro 2000 was set up explicitly to help the relevant Council working party to propose amendments to the handbook in the light of up-to-date experience. Below, the contents of Chapters 1 to 4 of the EU handbook are given, with in between (in bold) comments and recommendations based on the conclusions of the evaluation process. Measures should be taken to ensure that the arrangements of the handbook continue to be evaluated and amended in future. A continuous learning process at a European level is called for.

## **9.2 Chapter 1 of the EU handbook: Preparations for police co-operation (see chapter 5 of this report)**

The formal request for support should come from the Minister responsible in the organising country, who will receive advice from the police forces concerned. Taking into account the specific aims of the co-operation, the request should mention the scale and composition of support.

The request for support should be made to the foreign police force well in advance of a championship and/ or match. The supporting foreign police team will require at least eight weeks' preparation time

**In the event of a championship considerably more time than eight weeks will be required**

The police forces of the organising countries should only request foreign police support from countries that can contribute added value

**Added value needs to be defined more precisely. There are certainly considerable differences between the knowledge and experience concerning football-fans, but even a limited contribution can be of value. Participation in the international co-operation effort by sending spotters increases commitment. Measures should be encouraged that help these countries to build the necessary experiences, to the benefit of the organisation of future events. Exclusion of some countries would run counter to a Europe that is and will be characterised by increasing international police co-operation in many areas.**

International police co-operation is geared to ensuring the safety of the event, with the following specific aims:

1. intelligence gathering
2. reconnaissance
3. spotting
4. crowd control under police supervision

The police forces from the supporting countries are responsible for providing an advance risk analysis

**Arrangements should be made about the time the risk analysis will have to be available and what the minimum content should be. In fact, with regular championships and many international matches taking place, risk analysis should be a continuous process within EU countries**

In the first instance, a risk analysis of the fan group from the country concerned will determine which of the four areas of police co-operation mentioned in the fourth indent is to be requested by the police force of the organising country

**Clear arrangements should be made about mutual expectations in this respect**

The foreign police force will indicate the extent to which it can meet the request to provide support for the police force of the organising country. The scale of the foreign police team will then be determined in consultation

The size of the police team will therefore not be the same for all countries, but will relate to some extent to the threat and risk posed by fans from the country concerned and to practicalities

Depending on the nature of the support to be provided and the size of the team, a foreign police team could be responsible for the following duties:

1. operational police officers with reconnaissance, spotting or escorting duties
2. an operations co-ordinator with the task of co-ordinating the work of the operational police officers and channelling information
3. a spokesman
4. a liaison officer responsible in particular for the exchange of information between that officer's home country and the host country. In view of the differing expertise involved in the areas of public order, violent football hooliganism and terrorism, the national liaison officer could propose that the host country agree to the stationing of a second liaison officer at the host country's co-ordination centre
5. a leader, who is functionally and hierarchically in charge of a team; if however, there is a national police co-ordination centre, the leader is only the liaison's officer hierarchical superior, functional responsibility for the liaison officer then rests with the head of the co-ordination centre

**This composition of the teams has proven to be adequate**

The police forces in the organising country should provide an opportunity for the supporting foreign police forces to acquaint themselves with the organisation of police operations in the host country and/or the venue towns and with stadium location, as well as to get to know the operational commanders at the venue towns on the match days.

**This should be done in a timely fashion and should include visits of the foreign liaisons to the information centre**

### **9.3 Chapter 2 of the EU handbook: Organising co-operation between police forces (see chapter 6 of this report)**

The quality of action by the police in a host country will be improved if they obtain police support from the countries from which violent supporters come

**The quality may be improved even further by obtaining police support from all participating countries**

Maximum use should be made of the support that foreign police forces can supply, which will thus form part of the host organisation's tactical plan

**“Maximum use” and “forming part of the tactical plan” need to be clarified. At the very least, the foreign police teams should be included in briefing and debriefing procedures**

**(using a language they can understand) and be made an explicit partner in the information structure to make efficient use of the experience and knowledge of the foreign police teams**

The leader of the police team from the supporting country will, if desired, have his own spokesman. The leader of the police team will determine the position of that spokesman.

The spokesman assigned to a support team should shield the members of the support team from the media, if appropriate

The host police organisation should ensure the physical safety of supporting foreign police officers

**It should be clear what measures are taken to ensure the safety of foreign police and which individuals fulfil this role**

The police force of the organising country, in consultation with the football organisers, should ensure that the supporting foreign police team has sufficient accreditation (seating not required) to enable the team to carry out its tasks properly in and around the stadiums for matches that involve members of the police team in question

**Stewards should be made aware of these arrangements**

The police forces of the country from which the fans come should supervise risk fans from the start of their journey until they reach the country where the match is to be played.

Responsibility will be duly transferred between police forces at national borders (including transport and railway police)

**Potential troublemakers should be discouraged from travelling or, if legally possible, be prevented from travelling to the country where the match is to be played**

The host police organisation should assign the police team from the supporting country at least one accompanying police officer with sufficient language knowledge and proficiency to maintain operational contact with the team and make reports

**The accompanying police officer(s) and local guides should be knowledgeable about football hooliganism, public order maintenance and spotting; they should have a clear understanding of their task and of the task of the team they accompany**

The police force of the organising country should have available sufficient interpreters for the languages spoken by fans from visiting countries. This will relieve supporting police teams from the various countries of having to do too much interpreting, which would keep them from actual operational tasks

**There should also be interpreters, when necessary, to facilitate communication between foreign police teams and local police forces**

The host police organisation should provide the police team from the supporting country with the necessary communications equipment

**Mobile phones are useful, but it should be realised that they have their limitations**

The police from the supporting country should consult with the police force of the organising country about the equipment to be brought by the police team and the use made of it

## **9.4 Chapter 3 of the EU handbook: Information management by police forces (see chapter 7 of this report)**

The police forces of the organising countries should ensure that lines of communication and information facilities are clear to supporting foreign police forces, taking into account the nature of information, whether relating to terrorism, individual criminal records (for offenders), public order or violent football hooliganism

**Setting up an international message exchange system and permanent points for information and communication in all EU countries is advisable in the light of the continuous need for international police co-operation in relation to football matches. This will facilitate execution of a number of points mentioned below**

The police force of the organising country should communicate with the national police forces of the participating countries throughout the championship and/or match via the liaison officer appointed and supplied by the country in question. The liaison officer can be approached in the areas of public order, violent football hooliganism and terrorism

The police force of the organising country should shield the liaison officer of the supporting foreign police force from any contact with the media, if the liaison officer so wishes

The liaison officer should be stationed at the national co-ordination centre for championships spread over a number of days and at the local co-ordination centre for one-off matches in the host country concerned

The liaison officer of the supporting country is responsible for continually updating risk analysis

**Initiatives should be taken to develop common standards for the content of risk analyses, the information needed and the criteria used to assess risks**

The liaison officer of the supporting country should be kept up to date by the police force in his own country about fan behaviour there during championships or matches

The police force of the organising country should make arrangements to channel information received from the foreign police team promptly to the proper authorities within its own police organisation. The police force of the organising country should appoint an information officer to be attached to the support team responsible for reconnaissance or spotting. That officer should serve as a contact for the team leader and be responsible for the proper channelling of information

The police forces of the organising country should ensure that there are no differences in the quality of information available at local and national level

**Minimum requirements for the set up of local and national information centres should be formulated, based on the experiences gained during Euro 2000**

If there are national and local police co-ordination centres, the local and national centres should keep one another informed. This information flow should take into account information provided by the liaison officer from the supporting country

When fans are returning home, the national co-ordination centre in the organising country will inform the police force of the fan's home country, along with the police forces of transit

countries, if there is any reason to anticipate trouble. In the absence of a national co-ordination centre, the local co-ordination centre should fulfil this function

## **9.5 Chapter 4 of the EU handbook: Co-operation between police forces and stewards (see chapter 8 of this report)**

Police forces and stewards' organisations should work together on a complimentary basis, without prejudice to each side's own responsibilities and tasks

**This is good practice, but it should be realised that the security organisation of the stadium/ the organiser of the event may include security companies, volunteers etc. in addition to stewards. Attention should be paid to ensure a clear separation between the management of public and private order**

Police forces should work with senior officials from stewards' organisations

Police forces should consider placing a senior official from the stewards' organisation in their own command centre

**This has again proven to be good practice**

Police forces should ensure that any information from the stewards' organisation is channelled to the proper police authorities in the organising country

Police forces should ensure that senior officials from stewards' organisations have the information needed to carry out their tasks

The police forces of the supporting country should maintain contact with senior officials responsible for stewards from their country who are providing support to the organising country.

## 10. Police Behavioural profile

### 10.1 Introduction

In international police practice, differences in the maintenance of law and order occur between police services as to their intervention methods: the approach is sometimes more preventive and proactive, on other occasions more repressive and reactive. At present, there is insufficient systematic knowledge available as regards the effects of these different approaches on the risk of occurrence and escalation of irregularities. Within the framework of the maintenance of public order and safety, it was considered important by the authorities and police forces concerned to treat fans visiting the Netherlands and Belgium during Euro 2000 in more or less the same manner at different locations. Major differences in police intervention might lead to irritation and could entail incidents. On the basis of practical experiences and previous research (Adang, 1998) a “Police behavioural profile Euro 2000” was drawn up to bring about an equal influence on the behaviour of visitors, to bring clarity and to promote a positive image of the authorities and the police services. The behavioural profile stressed that the primary approach should be preventive and proactive.

The binational policy document Euro 2000 determined the basic principles (which were subsequently confirmed in national policy documents in both countries) with a view to a univocal approach in both countries throughout the event. The common “behavioural profile” was thoroughly treated in all documents. Policy points of departure were:

- ♦ An analogous set-up and intervention of police services and a similar treatment of supporters, both in host cities and in other cities;
- ♦ Participation of civilians/ visitors in safe and festive circumstances. Minimal disturbance of daily life by the football event;
- ♦ The police intervention was to be firm yet positive: the intervention should be preventive rather than late and excessively repressive, the intervention with regard to risk supporters was to be correct yet firm;
- ♦ A visible yet discreet permanently present police, in all places, linked to the possibility of fast proportional intervention;
- ♦ Behaviour in principle: friendly, unprejudiced and straightforward.

These policy points of departure and the tolerance limits gave the strategic framework for the police intervention, the general goal being: to contribute to the success of this event and to create a positive image. Of course the translation of the strategic framework into actual police deployment was a local responsibility. The police in the host cities (and other cities) had to convert the aforementioned ideas in tactical concepts, naturally taking the directives of the local administrative authorities into account. Tactical concepts, as expressed in scenarios and orders, were naturally custom-made per match and depended on binational and local risk analyses, among other things. Still, the tactical concepts were expected to follow the basic concept formulated on the basis of the strategic framework.

This basic tactical concept had the following characteristics:

- ♦ Primarily a preventive approach, secondarily a repressive approach;
- ♦ Possibility of fast interventions to avoid repressive measures;
- ♦ Certainty among police officers (good briefings and exchange of information, good agreements on responsibility and competence, decentralised and quickly accessible backup, ...);

- ♦ Small surveillance units in regular uniform, who are easily approachable and actively contact fans;
- ♦ Decentralised intervention units (with their specific tools such as riot police vehicles, dogs, water carts) are kept away from the street scene for as long as possible;
- ♦ Fast information flow from the proper information teams and use of the knowledge and skills of the foreign police services;
- ♦ Debriefings and amelioration in view of the next match (learning organisation).

According to the behavioural profile, the ideal Euro 2000 police officer met the following criteria:

- ♦ Has a good knowledge of the policy points of departure and the tolerance limits;
- ♦ Knows his task;
- ♦ Is duly informed and stays up to date;
- ♦ Passes on information correctly and rapidly;
- ♦ Is approachable;
- ♦ Looks for active contact with the supporters;
- ♦ Contributes to a festive course of events by his actions;
- ♦ Respects other cultures and nationalities;
- ♦ Is unbiased;
- ♦ Recognises potentially violent situations in time;
- ♦ Is not afraid to intervene severely yet justly and in time;
- ♦ Treats the visitors as guests.

In this chapter, it is analysed to which extent the actual deployment of police and the actual police behaviour reflected the tactical concept and the attitude and behaviour wished for. Also, it is investigated whether or not these efforts had the intended effect: did they contribute to the orderly and festive course of the tournament or not?

The following data were used:

1. documents relevant to the preparation for the behavioural profile: training programmes, scenarios, operational plans;
2. observations (by the international monitoring team and the binational evaluation teams) of briefings and on the street: samples, 24 hour reports, journals;
3. answers to checklists (completed by spotters and the international monitoring team).

## **10.2 The hospitality approach and providing security: police preparations**

A lot of initiatives were taken to realise a hospitality approach. Police measures were complementary to these initiatives. Both police preparations (training, development of operational plans, briefings) and police deployment (command and control, attitude of individual officers) were of relevance in this respect. Of course all measures had to depend on the existing infrastructure of the city, the stadium, transport and parking facilities, etc. In this chapter, we are concerned with the factualities of the police contribution to a safe and festive Euro 2000.

In all operational plans made before the start of Euro 2000, the friendly but firm hospitality approach was emphasised. The police services in each city did this in their own way. Some elements returned time and again, such as the necessity to have a good knowledge of mobility plans and routes to be taken by fans to be able to show fans the way, the ability to inform fans actively. Co-operation with other police forces involved (in Belgium between municipal police and Gendarmerie, in the Netherlands with police from other regional forces providing assistance) was also a returning issue, as were a visible presence (visibility was enhanced through wearing of highly visible fluorescent vests) and pro-active interventions. Often specific vehicles were designated to be located at important points to be able to inform fans. People were to be assigned jobs they have the skills for.

In all cities but one, a command structure based on the Gold – Silver – Bronze distinction was set up well before the start of the tournament. In several cities, a lot of effort was spent to integrate the operations of different police services as much as possible. The strategic framework was translated in the police organisation and police methods to be used. Some cities took innovative measures to realise this.

In one city, a made-to-measure approach was developed, explicitly based on a thorough risk analysis. The goal was to prevent overkill, while avoiding unnecessary risks. A focused deployment of officers, linked as much as possible to local policing was sought. Community policing officers were expected to continue their work, giving special attention to matters potentially related to Euro 2000. Dedicated teams of four police officers were deployed at important locations in the host city itself. If necessary, they could receive assistance from “flying squads” of six officers each. Riot police would be positioned out of view of the public, only to be deployed in case of (threatening) public order incidents.

Another city explicitly decentralised responsibility for police action on fixed locations to shorten command lines and to allow more flexibility in police deployment. Officers (including intervention police) were posted flexibly on fixed locations under a local commander. The local commander had full responsibility for the maintenance of public order on “his” location.

A third city made a clear distinction between a highly visible hospitality police, (consisting of officers working alone or in pairs, patrolling on foot, on bikes and on mopeds) and intervention police (riot units, to be localised decentrally out of view of the public).

In most cities, all officers were informed about the principles involved in the “police behavioural profile”. In the Netherlands, four video films were made to support the training sessions, which never lasted longer than one day. In Belgium, all officers received four half-day training sessions. Both in Belgium and the Netherlands, all officers received a Euro-2000 pocketbook with information on the policy points, the tolerance limits, and the strategic

framework. Special emphasis was put on the contribution of the individual officer to the overall mission and to the behaviour expected of him/ her. The pocketbook also contained information about the international police co-operation effort, information centres, judicial and legal matters, accreditation and, of course, Euro 2000 itself.


On match days, information was provided to officers during briefings. This included information on the task that they had to perform. In theory, commanding officers would also stress the type of behaviour and attitude expected of officers in order to be able to fulfil that task according to the policy points and the behavioural profile. This did not occur at every briefing we observed.

### 10.3 The hospitality approach and providing security: police deployment


The international team, which observed police operations in all eight host cities, noticed that tactical concepts actually used did not consistently conform to the basic concept. The team distinguished between two different policing styles: high profile public order policing with a relatively large police presence in three cities and a (relatively speaking) lower profile public order policing with fewer numbers of visible police in the other (five) cities. In the remainder of this chapter, it will be investigated whether or not this distinction is confirmed by the data.

#### 10.3.1 High and low profile: a quantitative analysis


The analysis of the observations by the binational evaluation teams in each city confirms the difference between a high profile police presence and low profile policing. In "high profile" cities there were on average three times as many police officers present, compared with "low profile" cities (on average 30 versus 10 officers per 100 fans, respectively). This was true for both the matches with and without increased risk (based on the binational risk analysis made beforehand), as is indicated in Figure 1. As Figure 1 also makes clear, in both cities with a high and low profile, the number of visible officers was roughly trebled for matches with increased risk. It should be borne in mind that these figures reflect the ratios of police officers to fans as they were visible at the times and locations at which observations were made (in city centres and around sites, at places where fans gathered). The ratios do not reflect the **total** number of police deployed in relation to the **total** number of fans.




Not just the number of officers differed between the different cities. The types of police differed as well. In “high profile” cities riot police was visibly present on the streets in one out of five samples (21% of 258 samples), whereas in “low profile” cities, riot police was visibly present in less than one out of ten samples (9% of 400 samples). The difference is highly significant (Chi-square test,  $p < .001$ ) and was visible both on days with a normal risk as on days with a match with increased risk (Figure 2). As Figure 2 also makes clear, in both cities with a high and low profile, the presence of riot police increased on days with matches with increased risk.



The same trend is visible for the presence of riot police vehicles. In “high profile” cities riot vehicles were more often visibly present on the streets (62% of 258 samples), than in “low profile” cities (42% of 400 samples). Again, the difference is highly significant (Chi-square test,  $p < .001$ ) and visible both on days with a normal risk as on days with a match with increased risk (Figure 3). As Figure 3 also makes clear, in both cities with a high and low profile, the presence of riot vehicles increased on days with matches with increased risk.



The percentage of samples in which there was at least one friendly contact between a fan and an officer, is slightly higher in “low profile” cities than in “high profile” cities (43% versus 36% of the samples, Chi-square test,  $p < .05$ ). This difference is interesting in light of the larger number of officers present in “high profile” cities. Based on numbers alone, the likelihood of contact increases with increasing numbers of police present. Figure 4 reveals that both in “high profile” and “low profile” cities, the number of friendly contacts between police and fans decreased on days when there was a match with increased risk. On these days, there was no significant difference between high and low profile cities as regards the frequency of contacts between police and fans.



### **10.3.2 High and low profile: a qualitative analysis**

Characteristic observations in “low profile” cities were that the number of police present showed a clear relation to the number of fans and to potential risks involved. Police moved around in pairs or small groups. Police officers were uniformly dressed and clearly distinguishable, e.g. because of fluorescent vests. There was a clear separation between “normal” police officers and intervention police, which was hardly visible. When circumstances changed, the number of police officers changed. Police officers were clearly visible and actively informed fans, if possible in a language the fans could understand. Fans exceeding tolerance limits were addressed immediately.

However, some contradictory observations could be made as well. Not all police officers were as active as others: for them “being there” seemed to be sufficient. For some officers language proved to be a barrier. Officers not familiar with the host city concerned often were unable to provide fans with the information they asked for (but more often than not the officers would take some trouble to get at the relevant information).

On several locations, police was almost completely absent, in spite of large numbers of fans or potential risks. Examples include public transport packed with fans (partly under the influence of alcohol) and parts of the city with emotional fans but without police supervision. Sometimes, intervention police units were prominently visible, often chatting with one another. On other occasions, a group of fans started a brawl without the police intervening: they just waited for the riot police to arrive. After normalcy had returned following an incident, it usually took some time before the riot police was withdrawn and the police presence was adjusted to the actual situation.

Characteristic observations in “high profile” cities were the clear visibility of large numbers of intervention police units with dog handlers, riot police vehicles, water cannon present in the streets. Policing vehicles on the move often used the blue-lights. The number of police present seemed to be independent of context and risks. Police officers were often clustered in larger groups. The attitude of police officers was more aloof than inviting. Police officers were uniformly dressed and clearly distinguishable, e.g. because of fluorescent vests. In the streets, “normal” police officers and police in riot gear are intermingled. In spite of the large numbers of police present overall, it was remarkable to notice that on some locations, no police was present at all. On several occasions, police officers did not read the early signs of potential violence, which led to reactive responses (with sometimes brave behaviour by individual officers). Several times, a lack of anticipation was reflected in the absence of preplanning to manage certain locations. The presence of large numbers of passive policemen did not contribute to a friendly but firm policing approach.

However, also in “high profile” cities other, contradictory, observations could be made which contributed to a more balanced impression. Active involvement of police officers in hospitality could be observed, with a friendly, informative and patient approach to fans (although fans usually had to take the initiative). On occasion, efforts were made to be able to address fans in their own language, e.g. by deploying officers from migrant groups. One of the observers phrased it as follows: “It looks like a friendly siege. There is a lot of police, but they are not at all provocative”. Several officers spontaneously indicated that they would prefer a more outgoing approach, but that the fact that they were deployed in large formations prevented this. The international monitoring team recognised that in these cities as well a lot of effort was spent to prevent fans becoming aggressive.

### 10.3.3 High and low profile : opinion of spotters and international monitoring team

In addition to the observations by the binational observers in each city, both the members of the foreign spotters' teams and the international monitoring team were asked to complete a questionnaire directly after their visit to a city. The questionnaire included 25 statements that were derived directly from the police behavioural profile. These questionnaires were completed independently by the individuals responding and independently of the binational observation teams. Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 whether or not – based on what they themselves had experienced or observed – the actions of local police and local police officers were in agreement with the respective statements. A total of 197 questionnaires were completed. The results are summarised in the table below, again distinguishing between cities with high profile public order policing (62 questionnaires) and low profile public order policing (135 questionnaires). A score of 5 means total agreement, a score of 1 total disagreement.

<b>Police officers in this city:</b>	low profile	high profile	
Used the knowledge and skills of foreign police services	4,3	3,6	***
Clearly stated limits of tolerance	4,3	3,4	***
Gave a lot of attention to prevention and pro-action	4,4	3,4	***
Had clearly defined responsibilities and command structures	4,3	3,6	***
Knew the policy well	4,4	3,6	***
Knew tolerance limits well	4,3	3,5	***
Clearly knew what their task was	4,4	3,6	***
Were well informed	4,2	3,3	***
Passed through relevant information in a timely and correct way	4,3	3,5	***
Were easily approachable by fans	4,4	3,4	***
Defined their actions in a strongly individual way	3,4	2,8	***
Contributed to a festive event by their behaviour	4,3	3,2	***
Showed respect for different cultures and nationalities	4,4	3,4	***
Were partial	2,3	2,4	ns
Were strict in their behaviour	3,3	3,3	ns
Quickly recognised violent-prone situations	4,1	3,5	***
Primarily fulfilled a preventive role	4,4	3,1	***
Were just in their behaviour	4,3	3,4	***
Were prejudiced	2,0	2,4	ns
Had adequate back-up available	4,3	3,8	***
Had short lines of command and communication	4,1	3,2	***
Treated visitors as guests	4,5	3,1	***
Primarily fulfilled a repressive role	2,3	3,2	***
Actively contacted fans	4,0	3,1	***
Switched flexibly between different approaches when necessary	4,1	3,1	***
*** highly significant, $p < .001$ (t-test)			

As is clear from the table, there were consistent differences between the cities with high and low profile policing with regard to police conduct. 22 out of the 25 items reveal a highly significant difference, all but one in the same direction: police conduct in cities with low profile policing was more in line with the “behavioural profile”. The largest differences were visible for the following items: police officers in “low profile” cities were more easily approachable by fans, contributed more to the festive nature of the event, showed more respect for different cultures and nationalities, fulfilled a more preventive role, treated visitors more as guests and switched more flexibly between different approaches when necessary.

Both in cities with high and low profile policing, police officers acted impartially and without prejudice and, remarkably enough, there was no significant difference between the strictness with which police officers acted in cities with high and low-profile policing (indicating that low profile policing is not equal to “soft” policing or not adhering to tolerance limits).


One other interesting result is for the item “defined their actions in a strongly individual way”. According to the behavioural profile, it was considered important that officers adhered to guidelines given them by their commanders, instead of setting their own rules. This was the only item for which the score of high profiling policing cities was more in line with the behavioural profile.

There was also an interesting link between the findings on international police co-operation and these findings on the police conduct: the “low” profile policing cities generally scored higher on the different aspects of international police co-operation (chapter 6), with one exception: one of the “low profile” cities, had the lowest scores on international police co-operation!

#### **10.3.4 High and low profile and public order**

For the observations, a distinction was made between three types of incidents involving violence: small (with less than 5 involvees), medium (between 5 and 10 involvees) and larger incidents (with more than 10 involvees). As will be remembered, observations took place on match days in the hours immediately preceding and after the match, on locations where fans were gathered (in the city centres and around the sites). At every 15-min. sample, it was noted if an incident had occurred since the previous sample. This turned out to be the case for 10% of all samples (N = 664), with roughly one-third of the incidents being small, one-third medium and one-third involving at least 10 individuals.

The large numbers of police present in the “high profile” cities did not correlate with a smaller number of incidents in those cities. In fact, there was no significant difference in the number of incidents in “high profile” and “low profile” cities (8% of the samples versus 7% of the samples, Chi-square test). One would expect more incidents around “increased risk” matches, but a view at Figure 5 learns that it is not as simple as that: relatively speaking, incidents were most frequent in “high profile” cities on days *without* increased risk! A closer inspection of the data reveals that this figure can be attributed to incidents in just one of the three “high profile” cities. Qualitative observations suggest that in this city (as opposed to others) collective police action in the form of stopping fans or removing them was frequently taken prior to (rather than as a response to) incidents.



## 10.4 Conclusions

Summarising the results, the questions this study set out to answer can now be dealt with. To what extent was the behavioural profile reflected in actual deployment and actual police behaviour and did these efforts contribute to the orderly and festive course of the tournament?

In light of the relatively low number of incidents and the overall festive and safe nature of the event, police deployment and behaviour may be said to have had the expected effect. The types of incidents that occurred during Euro 2000 (see chapter 3) were anticipated, although specific incidents could not always be foreseen. Police were able to respond to incidents quickly and firmly, which prevented escalation. During the event, police forces were able to adjust their deployment as a result of experiences gained. Overall, hospitality predominated and the introduction of a “police behavioural profile” was apparent in police deployment and police behaviour in the host cities. However, the ideal of a uniform policing approach was not completely reached.

Two policing styles could be discerned, labelled here “high profile public order policing” and “low profile public order policing”. The term “low profile” is not entirely accurate in this respect, because cities that adopted this approach had on average 10 visible police officers per 100 fans in the streets (at locations where fans gathered in large numbers). That is still a considerable number of officers, compared to every day policing practices and to the norm for the number of stewards inside a stadium (1 steward for every 100 fans). Nevertheless, a clear difference existed between the two policing styles. The difference was clear both from the systematic observations of the binational teams per host city and from the qualitative observations of foreign spotters (who were active in more than one host city each) and the international monitoring team (which visited each of the eight host cities and was in the best position to make comparisons).

Characteristic of the “low profile” approach were a substantial, but limited number of police officers in daily uniform, patrolling in pairs or small groups, interacting with fans. These interactions were friendly, but transgressions by fans were responded to quickly. In the low profile approach, police deployment seemed to be based more on intelligence based and on information provided by spotters’ teams. For the “high profile” approach more than three times as many officers were visible in the streets. These officers were more often dressed in riot gear and accompanied by their riot vehicles; they formed larger groups, which made it less easy to approach them. It is important to note that the distinction made here is much more subtle than the distinction between paramilitary and non-paramilitary styles of public order maintenance (Waddington, 1993, Jefferson, 1993). In both “high profile” and “low profile” approaches, a clear command and control structure was in place and use could be made of intervention units with riot gear.

As clear as the distinction between high and low profile policing was, it was not absolute. Both in cities with a high and in cities with a low profile approach, elements of the other approach could be discerned regularly. In all host cities, police officers acted without prejudice and impartially. Both in cities with a high and in cities with a low profile approach, a lot of initiatives were taken to welcome fans, to inform them, to direct them to the city centres and stadiums. Fan co-ordinators, fan-embassies, city stewards, entertainment all contributed to a hospitality approach and police behaviour complemented this.

Before Euro 2000, the police behavioural profile met with criticism from some officers. In their view, the behavioural profile stated the obvious and simply described daily officer behaviour. To them, the emphasis on the behavioural profile was an insult: it implied that they had to be told how to do their job properly, because the way they used to do it was supposedly wrong. The fact that, generally speaking, police behaviour was often along the lines of the behavioural profile indicates that, for many officers, this profile probably did not deviate dramatically from what they did daily. However, the results of this study indicate that neither in “low profile” nor in “high profile” cities, officer behaviour corresponded exactly to the behavioural profile. Not surprisingly, this indicates that, for a change in attitude to occur, more is needed than a one-day training. Applying the police behavioural profile involves more than every officer wearing the same uniform correctly. In addition, defining a behavioural profile may be regarded as an example of clear leadership: by adopting and promoting a behavioural profile commanding officers give a clear indication how they want their officers to behave.

Based on the results of this study, the “low profile” approach can be considered good practice. It is possible to maintain public order effectively (and efficiently, considering the fact that less officers are needed) in this way while at the same time contributing to the festive nature of the event. A larger number of officers at the scene does not mean that there will be fewer violent incidents. At the same time, the “low profile” approach is not a laissez-faire approach: it involves officers actively responding at an early stage to relatively minor infractions of the preset tolerance limits. There were no differences in the “strictness” with which officers acted in high and low profile cities. However, in the “low profile” approach there was a tendency for officers to define their actions more individually than in “high profile” cities, which could be disadvantageous. The international monitoring team also issued a warning: although the low-key, communicative, service-oriented approach works very well, it might be difficult to change if the situation calls for it.

There is no simple correlation between the approach adopted and the number of incidents. It

is clear from the data that a larger number of officers does not necessarily lead to fewer incidents. If they do not respond to transgressions or are not present at risk-locations, the influence of a large number of officers may be limited. In view of the number of officers deployed (especially in the “high profile” cities) it was amazing that on several occasions, no officers at all were present on certain locations in spite of the presence of potential troublemakers there. On the other hand, a “high profile” approach in itself does not cause incidents and it would be wrong to label a “high profile” approach as “bad practice”. Only if a “high profile” approach is accompanied by more aggressive policing methods may the likelihood of violent incidents occurring be raised. This seemed to be the case in one of the host cities. This was also the only city in which a command and control structure that did not conform to the Gold- Silver-Bronze model was used and in which the binational risk analyses were not used.

Of course, police behaviour is only one of many relevant factors influencing the development and escalation of public order incidents. The most important factor influencing public order and safety surrounding football matches, is the types of individuals that become involved (Adang, 1998). In this respect, for most countries, fans following the national team usually pose less of a threat to public order than fans following club teams. This in itself limits the number of potential troublemakers coming to an event such as Euro 2000. Further help came from the fact that the national teams with the most violent following were out of the tournament after the first round. In addition, through the international police co-operation effort, many potential troublemakers did not make it to the Netherlands or Belgium at all, because they were persuaded to stay at home or because they were stopped at the border. These circumstances made a friendly but firm hospitality-oriented approach more feasible.

Generally speaking, the conclusion can be drawn that the police deployment contributed to the safe and festive nature of the event. There were only a limited number of mostly minor and short incidents in the host cities. Based on the data gathered, several elements of “good practice” can be distinguished. These include the following:

- development of a clear behavioural profile,;
- communication and training to implement the behavioural profile;
- continued attention for the behavioural profile during briefings and debriefings, also in the period leading up to the event;
- actively contacting fans (obtaining information, building a relationship);
- making police presence strongly dependent on information gathering and risk analysis;
- police officers patrolling in pairs or small groups;
- police officers being clearly visible, standing out in the crowd;
- clearly communicating tolerance limits and acting on them;
- short and clear command lines.

# 11. Evaluating the evaluation procedure

## 11.1 Introduction

From the outset, the project Police Expertise Euro 2000 was restricted to evaluate certain aspects of the binationally prepared arrangements. Others will have to decide whether or not the results of these efforts were worthwhile. However, a few points concerning the procedure used can be made at this moment.

In the course of the project, several innovative measures were introduced, which will be dealt with below. It was the first time a project like this was implemented. Because of that, preparations to develop a workable model started a year before Euro 2000. First, a general model for the evaluation of large-scale police operations was developed (see chapter 2). Crucial elements in this model were the need to make a clear distinction between learning for the future and accountability, and a clear recognition that each organisation has its own responsibility as far as evaluation is concerned. Consistent application of these principles combined with a timely identification of evaluation points and evaluation instruments allowed for a climate in which both the binational observers and the international monitoring team were welcome to do their work. All involved knew about the aims of the project and knew that data would be gathered and divulged in a responsible way.

## 11.2 Direct feed-back

According to the model developed, each organisation is responsible for its own evaluation. The interim report suggested a way by which police forces could organise their own evaluation. As a result, four police forces supplemented their usual debriefing procedures by forming a local evaluation team. These teams were composed of police officers from the force concerned, as well as from outside police forces (in three host cities). The teams made their own plans in consultation with the local Gold Commander. In conformity with the model developed, evaluation points and instruments were identified, as well as the timing of the feedback. During Euro 2000, the teams provided direct feedback within 24h, thus enabling the local police organisation to make adjustments. In the cities with local evaluation teams, the binational observation teams also provided feedback to the Gold Commander within 24h (in one city the local evaluation team and the binational observers worked closely together).

These initiatives were considered beneficial and some (smaller) adjustments were actually made as a result of the feedback received. In the Netherlands, this approach is now being extended. Several "evaluation teams" are in the process of being formed under the co-ordination of a recently established centre of expertise and several police forces are making "evaluation teams" an integral part of their operational plans for large scale police operations.

## 11.3 International monitoring team

Because the international monitoring team visited every host city, they were in a unique position to compare differences in approaches used in these cities. The host cities may be complimented for their willingness to co-operate with these outside police observers. Of course, the international monitoring team did not have the opportunity to make an in-depth study. This was compensated in large part by their expertise, which allowed them to recognise points of interest quickly. The two preparatory meetings for the international monitoring team held well in advance of Euro 2000 avoided that the team had to gather a lot of basic information during the event itself. The first day in each city was spent in local reconnaissance and interviewing people, the second day was mainly used for observations. In

no way were police operations disrupted by activities of the international monitoring team. The composition of the team (four officers from three different countries with two accompanying officers) allowed for a flexible deployment in which tasks could easily be divided. The different backgrounds of team-members guaranteed the exchange of different perspectives. The team was fully accredited, had portable audio-recorders, two cars and two computers available and worked hard to make observations, discuss their observations with one another and report their findings. The combination of structured checklists and free-formatted reports, interchanged with verbal debriefings, allowed for a clear and consistent feedback.

### **11.4 Observation teams**

The (binational) observation teams were composed of police officers (not from host cities) and a few university students. At the last moment, several members had to withdraw from the teams due to personal circumstances. Luckily, surplus members had been trained already as reserves.

The background of the police officers differed: some were member of an observation team, several were trainers (and had been involved in training the “behavioural profile”) others had experience as member of riot police units. This background made them knowledgeable about the way the police and the way in which large-scale police operations are organised. Selection of the members proved to be important. Half of the candidates were actively selected, the other half were provided to us. These candidate observers did not always meet the profile in view (e.g. with regard to computer skills). The candidates who were not part of the police generally met the intended profile, except for a few who were not able to work independently.

Without exception the observers felt they had learnt a lot by looking at police operations in a different police force, or even in a different country. Many had to get used to the systematic way in which the observations were conducted and subsequently entered into a computer. They felt that more extensive training had better prepared them to do their job well, especially considering the fact that the final observation instruments were not yet available during the training and practice sessions (in fact, these sessions were used to test and adjust the instruments).

The presence of university students, who were fairly naive on police operations, introduced a perspective different from that of police officers. This effect was intended and greatly appreciated by the teams. The students were somewhat more concerned about their personal safety, although in practice this did not prove to be a problem. All members of the evaluation teams were instructed beforehand to distance themselves from violent incidents. The presence of university students, who are more familiar with research, in the teams helped the systematic gathering and entry of the data.

Without the highly structured methodology used, the net result of the data gathering process would have been much less. The methodology made it possible for observers with a limited knowledge of evaluation to gather useful data in a systematic way. However, some basic knowledge of evaluation procedures and computer skills (use of a word processor, spreadsheet and email) proved to be essential.

For the teams to be able to function properly, a good preparation and communication with the host cities is essential. Well before the start of Euro 2000, visits were paid to all host cities, written arrangements were sent to commanding officers and on top of that a meeting with commanders from all host cities was organised. These initiatives considerably eased a smooth

functioning of the binational evaluation teams. In spite of that, in a few cities binational evaluation teams did not feel that the communication process had been sufficient: not everyone knew of their existence and some arrangements had not been made. The activities of the binational observation teams did not interfere in any way with police operations and made a minimal demand on police facilities: all the project asked for was a room with a computer and a telephone for the team to work in. Some cities were able to provide the teams with excellent facilities, in other cities the teams had to organise their own facilities. In every team, three observers were accredited to be able to conduct observations on the sites within the perimeters. Because of arrangements between the stadium and the local police, in one of the cities it was not possible to conduct observations inside the stadium. The observation at information centres proved to be most difficult. This was due to limited space and accessibility on the one hand and difficult observation conditions on the other hand. Much of the information exchange is computerised and many exchanges are hard or impossible to follow. This places high demands on the quality of an observer in an information centre.

Observations were made in all eight host cities. It would have been interesting to conduct observations in other places as well (e.g. at the borders), but the choice was made not to do this, as this would entail using many more observers. Plans had been made to use a few “mobile” observers, but these observers were later used to fill gaps in the teams.

### **11.5 International feed-back**

During Euro 2000, over 100 foreign police officers were part of the police operation in Belgium and the Netherlands. To benefit the learning process, feedback from these officers was explicitly sought. It was felt that these officers were in a unique position to provide valuable insights. As knowledgeable police officers, they were really insiders, actively contributing to the operation. Coming from another country, they were outsiders with a fresh view on the way in which Belgian and Dutch police handled the event. At the last preparatory meeting in May, mention was made that their co-operation in the evaluation process would be sought. During Euro 2000, the foreign police teams completed many checklists. And although the teams were eager to leave for home once their national team was out of the tournament, all but one could be interviewed. Care has to be taken to provide a setting that allows not only polite, but also open, feedback. Both the exit-interviews and the checklists completed by the spotters’ provided valuable information for the evaluation of the international co-operation effort.

### **11.5 Conclusions**

To summarise the conclusions related to the evaluation methodology employed:

- observations by an independent team of international experts are useful in validating good practices independently and in helping to identify areas for improvement;
- seeking feedback from foreign police officers involved in the operation is a simple and effective way to gather valuable information;
- the concept of evaluation teams (using police officers from other forces and university students) deserves to be developed further;
- when there are specific evaluation points, more in-depth data gathering is needed. This needs careful preparation and consultation;
- both the model and the instruments developed in the course of the project police expertise Euro 2000 can be used, with the necessary modifications, on future occasions.

**Appendix I**

**POLICE EXPERTISE EURO 2000  
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING TEAM  
FINAL REPORT**

Malcolm George,  
Andreas Göhring,  
Ken Scott,  
Thierry Terraube

July, 3rd, 2000

## Introduction

As part of the project Police Expertise Euro 2000, an international team of police observers gathered data during Euro 2000. The International Monitoring Team was asked to focus on the issues of *international police cooperation, exchange of information, cooperation with stewards* (these issues are contained in Chapters 2-4 of the European Handbook on International Police Cooperation), on *police behaviour* and on *the evaluation methodology used in the course of the Project Police Expertise Euro 2000*. In addition, the team was given complete freedom to give its comments on other issues it might find relevant for the policing of international events.

This final report summarizes the findings of the International Monitoring Team. It is not meant as criticism but as an attempt to identify important lessons for future public order policing in an international context. To emphasize this perspective, the report does not focus on the decisions of specific individuals or the policing of specific matches, but rather on points of more general value.

The team wishes to thank all police officers and others in the Netherlands and Belgium who provided information. The team is especially grateful to accompanying officers Wim van de Burgt and Daniel Merlo.

The international monitoring team:  
Malcolm George,  
Andreas Göhring,  
Ken Scott,  
Thierry Terraube

## Methodology and material

In anticipation of the observations during Euro 2000, the international team acquainted themselves with the European Handbook for international police co-operation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches and attended two preparatory meetings:

- a two day meeting (January 31, February 1, 2000) at the Police Institute Public Order and Safety, Hoogerheide, the Netherlands (programme is contained in appendix I)
- a three day meeting (May 8-10, 2000) at the World Trade Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands (programme contained in Appendix II).

For the observations of the international monitoring team, a schedule had been put together in advance in consultation with team members. The schedule was set up in such a way that the team had the opportunity to visit each venue at least once for two days. However, the team was free to make changes to the schedule. With one exception, the team travelled as a whole from one city to another. Within a city, the team sometimes split up to gather information more efficiently.

The first day in each city was meant mainly as a preparatory day. The team (through its accompanying officers) notified local contacts of their arrival. They received an information package with relevant information about the local police organisation and preparations for the events. The binational evaluation team in the city concerned provided the team with information about the evaluation project. The team acquainted themselves with the layout of the city and focal points for the next day. Team members also had the opportunity to meet with police officers from all levels. No formal receptions were organised.

The second day in each city was meant for the observations proper. The operation had complete precedence on this day and the activities of the monitoring team did not interfere in any way with police operations.

### Appendix III gives a summary of the activities of the International Monitoring Team

The team reported its observations, impressions and conclusions in the following manner:

1. Two **debriefings** with project manager Otto Adang were scheduled, one after the first round (June, 22, Driebergen) and one after the last match (July, 3, Vlaardingen);
2. After each visit to a city, individual team members completed the “**police behaviour questionnaire**” provided by the project manager (Appendix IV, this is similar to the questionnaire completed by spotter teams and binational evaluation teams);
3. After each visit to a city, the team as a whole completed the “**police co-operation questionnaire**” provided by the project manager (Appendix V, this is based on the points contained in Chapter 1 –4 of the European Handbook for international police co-operation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with international football matches);
4. After each visit to a city, the team as a whole made a “**points of interest**” report. To gather the points of interest, the following procedure was used. Individual team members made a list of points that drew their attention, raised questions, etc. Next, team members

collectively made a list of all points (combining similar ones), without discussing them. Only after the list was complete, the team discussed it point by point by being as specific and factual as possible. The goal was not so much to reach consensus, but to achieve maximal clarity about different perspectives and arguments. After each point had been discussed, it was summarised on the form provided as factual and as specific as possible.

These data were handed over to the project manager to be analysed in conjunction with the other data gathered in the course of the Project Police Expertise Euro 2000.

In addition, the international monitoring team as a whole summarised their own findings in this **final report**.

## **Summary of Observations and overall conclusions**

### **Conclusions on preparation by police forces (chapter 1 EU Handbook)**

According to the EU handbook, organising authorities and police forces should involve police forces from participating countries at an early stage. The team was of course only able to see and hear about the result of these preparations, not having observed the preparations themselves (except for the meeting in May in Rotterdam).

It appeared to the International Team that there was sufficient time to make preparations for the tournament and that this time was put to good use e.g. through international conferences held by the host nations. From the perspective of the International Team the short term preparations of some of the foreign teams were ameliorated by the fact that spotter teams from different countries were staying at the same hotel and this facilitated local direct communication between the teams. Early arrival also assisted short term preparation. It proved advantageous for a team to be based in the same town for more than one match

The number of officers from other countries seemed to be adequate. Important differences existed between the international spotters regarding the level of preparedness. Some of the spotters did not appear to have the necessary and desirable qualifications (in the sense of appropriate experience and skills) to perform their task. Some were not police officers and/ or had no practical experience in dealing with football fans.

## **Conclusions on international police cooperation (chapter 2 EU Handbook)**

According to the EU handbook, organising authorities and police forces should take into account the requirements for the organisation of international police co-operation.

The experiences of the World Championship 1998 in France have clearly been put to good use. Good contacts existed between local police forces and spotter teams and Gold Commanders made use of the input provided by the spotters teams. In general, there was a good integration of spotters within tactical plans. However, not in every city, maximum use was being made of support that foreign police forces supplied. We observed several occasions when police did not react to intelligence supplied by spotters. In all cities, foreign police support was part of the local tactical plan, although in one of the cities this was only true in theory. On most occasions, the respective teams had a clear added value. They identified a large number of potential hooligans, and on occasions when there was no risk their presence allowed them to continuously update the risk assessment to the local Gold Commander. However, some teams had little or no added value. This could arise from a limited knowledge and experience concerning football-fans or from the fact that many fans of the national team concerned live in other countries and were not known to the foreign police teams.

The International Team cannot comment on the supervision of fans from the point of entry in the country to specific cities but there was undoubtedly good supervision from arrival in the city through the match until departure from the city. The flexibility in deployment was visible by the presence of spotters in cities where there was no match of the national team, but a presence of fans originating from the spotters' country. Also, the International team gained the impression that important work was being done in several participating countries by spotting fans or preventing known troublemakers from travelling. However, the exchange of personal data on (suspected) hooligans still seemed problematic.

The composition of the spotters teams seemed adequate, with Belgian and Dutch accompanied officers, accompanied cicerones and local guides, although on some occasions local guides did not appear to be properly informed about their tasks. The spotter team of one country included a press spokesman, who fulfilled an important role. However, he lacked any accompaniment.

### **Conclusions on the exchange of information (chapter 3 EU Handbook)**

According to the EU handbook, organising authorities and police forces should take into account the requirements of police information management.

The information structure during Euro 2000 (local information centres, national centre in Belgium, binational information centre with foreign liaisons in Driebergen) was excellent, with the use of technology being a positive aspect. At all levels (strategic, tactical, operational) horizontal communication remains essential. Generally speaking, clear lines of communication and adequate information facilities existed for foreign police. In most cases, Belgian and Dutch information officers attached to the foreign police teams properly channelled information to and from the proper authorities. The use of liaison officers at a local level (spotter-co-ordinators within local information centres) as well as at the BPIC helped to improve the two way flow of data and enhance operational planning. However, on some occasions local officers accompanying the teams fulfilled no useful functions because they were not adequately prepared or equipped for their task. Using the knowledge of the spotters and the information they provide is of course very important and there were differences in these respects between different cities. It is also vital that all concerned are clear about the way foreign police teams operate, their safety, limits to their intervention and about priorities (e.g. evidence gathering vs. continued spotting).

Special attention is needed for the information flow before and at the beginning of the event: a lot of information becomes available in a short time period. In addition, a lot of those involved have to get used to working with a (for them) new information system. Also, one has to ask the question how far we need to go with technology. The international team asked itself whether every recipient really needed the information provided to them. The danger of information overload is real. The BPIC was clearly a success-factor in the whole operation, but slow to start off. The interaction of people, increasing ability of the system and the absence of real risks after the first round all contributed to this success. An understanding of what is meant by an intelligence led operation by all is needed, as well as an awareness that intelligence gathering is a day to day continuous process, based on information gained domestically. Transit countries have a special responsibility in this respect as hooligans will circumvent measures. Feedback of a behaviour must go back to countries involved, for which we understand measures were taken.

## **Conclusions on the cooperation between police and stewards (chapter 4 EU Handbook)**

According to the EU handbook, organising authorities and police forces should bring in steward organisations to assist in the job being done.

Generally speaking, the quality of stewarding was high and stewards adequately fulfilled their tasks. There was generally a clear division of responsibilities and a clear understanding of the distinction between law and order and safety. We witnessed several examples of good short and efficient intervention by stewards. In all cities police forces and steward organisations worked together on a complementary basis. Police forces worked with senior officials from steward organisations who had the information they needed to carry out their tasks. Professionalism of stadium security managers enhanced this cooperation.

A clear distinction could be made between stadiums which are the home of a club and which are familiar with large attendances and those who are not: wherever there were full time managers at stadium clubs, procedures were visibly tried and tested and the quality of stewarding was higher. Sometimes the stadium structure interfered with the duties of stewards (e.g. where there was a void between seats and the playing field, where team dugouts were so high as to hinder spectators seeing the match, where rows were not numbered). Very modern stadiums (e.g. Arnhem) will work fine for an ordinary public, but might prove less beneficial at high-risk matches. Sometimes colours worn by stewards or volunteers were indistinguishable from those worn by fans.

The use of volunteers was positive, but there were differences in how they were used. Sometimes they were inappropriately used in first line cordons, and fulfilled de facto crowd control duties. In some stadiums use was made of security companies. The role of these security companies was not always as positive. The separation between the maintenance of public and private order was not always clear, and on several occasions security personnel was seen to be rigid and inflexible.

There was not always a dedicated briefing room for stewards. Interference caused by noise from extraneous sources affects the ability of those present to focus on the content and context of the briefing. There was no use of technology or visual aids observed at briefings. It was felt that this would have increased the comprehension of those present.

## **Conclusions on police behaviour in the police – public interaction**

Prior to Euro 2000 the Dutch and Belgian police developed a “police behavioural profile”. According to this behavioural profile, police officers should act in a “just and strict” way, communicating with fans, but intervening quickly when someone broke the law. Also, the behaviour of police officers should make an intelligence-led operation possible.

The international team clearly recognised that a lot of effort was spent to prevent fans becoming aggressive. A three-tier structure was noticeable, where police deployment ranged from hospitality to low key public order policing to heavy public order policing. Police officers and stewards speaking the language of the supporters, a good contact between the police and the public, good bus transfers, good signage, good information and good fan embassies contributed to a positive atmosphere. Sporadic instances of a van-culture (e.g. certain logos on T-shirts worn by riot police) did not fit with this image. On one occasion the international team observed a Bronze commander giving an improvised press-conferences on the street in the midst of an ongoing operation, which seemed to be taking the communicative approach a bit too far.

The international team also noticed that the efforts were not always carried out consistently. In some cities, officers were not aware of the three-tier structure. On other occasions, although a three-tier system was in use, the officers did not behave accordingly. Sometimes, the different police tiers were visibly present at the same time in the same streets. On several occasions, police officers did not read the early signs of potential violence, which led to reactive responses (with sometimes brave behaviour by individual officers). Several times, a lack of anticipation was reflected in the absence of preplanning to manage certain locations. The international team sometimes wondered whether contingency plans for every risk location were available. Also, the presence of large numbers of passive policemen, as could be observed on some occasions, did not contribute to a friendly but firm policing approach.

Although the low-key, communicative, service-oriented approach works very well if there is little risk involved, practice shows that it is difficult to change if the situations calls for it. On several occasions an abrupt change from passive policing to very aggressive policing could be observed, where both extremes were not entirely consistent with the actual situation. Operationally, the principles of an intelligence led operation were not always adhered to. We have witnessed instances where police officers ignored information, didn't know how to deal with it or didn't get the information they needed.

## **Other conclusions**

Euro 2000 in general went very well from a public order point of view. This success can partly be attributed to the international police co-operation, which clearly benefited from lessons learnt from previous tournaments. It is a pity that international police co-operation efforts at harmonisation are not reflected in legislation and that football tends to fall off the agenda after every tournament. There were also clear and transparent signs of a genuine co-operation between Belgium and the Netherlands. However, it should also be recognised that the two anticipating countries with the most hooligan problems were out of the tournament after the first round.

The assessment and categorization of support in three categories (A: peaceful, B: some potential for confrontation or disorder, especially alcohol-related, C: violence or organisers of violence) is generally accepted. However, the international team could not fail to notice that there are differences in the way each country assesses the potential for violence of fans. This has consequences for the type of information provided and the analyses of risks. To better deal with public order and safety, more agreement on the assessment of risk is needed, taking into account factors extraneous to football such as racism, xenophobia and the influence of ethnic minorities and migrants. E.g., as has been the case during earlier tournaments, during Euro 2000 migrant populations within the organising countries contributed to public order risks. In this respect, in one place, the International Team was able to observe local Turkish people being used by the police to assist in crowd direction and answering questions raised by Turkish supporters. We regard this as a positive idea.

The sale of alcohol is always an issue at events like this. The best course seems to be to base policies on a careful assessment of the risks involved, which may be different for fans from different countries. The first priority in developing a policy should be the security of all, not money. Of course, the policy should also be realistic. It is no use applying a policy which is impossible to enforce.

Evaluating Euro 2000, the international team also cannot get around commenting on press ethics. At times, the number of media representatives in the streets was huge. The presence of large numbers of journalists on anticipated trouble spots contributed to an expectation of disorder. Some media representatives seemed to be looking for incidents rather than information. We also observed occasions where the behaviour of some members of the press contributed to or provoked escalation of public order incidents (e.g. when their presence and behaviour incited fans or drew the attention of large numbers of fans to minor incidents).

The international team was impressed with the thoroughness of the evaluation methodology used by the binational observation teams. As far as we can tell, their (and our) observations did not interfere with the operation in any way.

## **Recommendations for the policing of future international events**

The international monitoring team feels that the provisions contained in the EU handbook contribute to an effective international police co-operation. Based on their observations and on the interviews held, the international monitoring team wishes to stress the importance of proper execution of some aspects already contained in the EU handbook and to make the following recommendations for the policing of future international events in Europe:

- The EU handbook should allow the host nation some flexibility in deciding on the level of spotters, if any, from each nation. It is suggested that foreign spotters teams should only be used if they have added value and have experience with and knowledge about fans and hooligans;
- the host police organisations should make efficient use of the experience and knowledge of the foreign police teams;
- the host police organisations should provide safety, knowledgeable guides (knowledge about local operation, fans etc), and interpreters if necessary. A press spokesman assigned to a support team also needs accompaniment;
- the EU needs to address legal aspects etc. of data exchange on (suspected) hooligans;
- host countries should positively support fan embassies and consider the use of stewards or other contact-persons in the streets, town and on camps;
- host countries should take care of a friendly but strict contact between police and fans, quick transfers and good signages;
- all countries involved need to ensure that there is continuous learning from previous tournaments. The issues involved should not be forgotten simply because the event is over!
- To avoid information overload at the beginning, it is recommended that relevant information is provided prior to the event and that liaison officers arrive early
- A timely and exact risk-analysis that is constantly updated by the participating countries for the benefit of organising countries is essential;
- host countries should take care of a consistent approach of fans
- Host countries should restrict the sale of alcohol where this is both appropriate (based on risk analyses) and possible/ realistic
- Participating countries should do all in their legal power to contain and influence potential troublemakers in their own country
- The Information Management structure at the BPIC is considered good practice and thought should be given how both the structure and the technology may be used on future occasions

## **Appendix I: Programme first preparatory meeting, Hoogerheide, the Netherlands**

Present:

Cameron, George, Göhring, Terraube (international team)

Van de Burgt (accompanying officer)

Heijnemans, van Oorschot (police project Euro 2000)

Adang (project police expertise Euro 2000)

Monday, January 31, 2000

12.00h - 13.00h      Arrival

13.00h - 14.00h      Lunch

14.00h - 17.00h      Introduction to the meeting (Adang)

The police organisation for Euro 2000 (van Oorschot)

Evaluation project (Adang)

17.30h – 18.30h      Dinner

19.00h - 21.00h      European handbook and police behavioural profile (Adang)

Tuesday, February 1, 2000

07.30h – 08.30h      Breakfast

08.30h – 12.00h      Proposed activities of international team (Adang)

12.00h – 13.00h      Lunch

13.00h                  Departure

## **Appendix II: Programme second preparatory meeting, Rotterdam, the Netherlands**

### **May 8, 2000: Presentation of police preparations**

Present:

George, Göhring, Terraube (international team)  
Van de Burgt, Merlo (accompanying officers international team)  
Brekelmans, van Peer (binational police project Euro 2000)  
Adang (project police expertise Euro 2000)  
Celliere (Gendarmerie Charleroi), Chantry (Gendarmerie Liège), De Wulf (police Bruges), Demey (gendarmerie Bruges), Heymans (police Brussels), Hogervorst (police Amsterdam), de Jong (police Rotterdam), van Kleef (police Arnhem), Lovenfosse (Police Liège), Martens (police Amsterdam), Regterschot (police Arnhem)

Programme:

13.00 – 13.15 Introduction  
13.15 – 13.45 Presentation Bruges  
13.45 – 14.15 Presentation Arnhem  
14.15 – 14.45 Presentation Liege  
14.45 – 15.00 break  
15.00 – 15.30 Presentation Eindhoven  
15.30 – 16.00 Presentation Brussels  
16.00 – 16.30 Presentation Amsterdam  
16.30 – 17.00 Presentation Rotterdam  
17.00 – 17.30 Presentation Charleroi  
17.30 – 18.00 Concluding discussion

### **May 9 & 10, 2000: International Conference Euro 2000**

Present:

George, Göhring, Terraube (international team)  
Van de Burgt (accompanying officer international monitoring team)  
Brekelmans, van Peer (binational police project Euro 2000)  
Adang (project police expertise Euro 2000)  
Celliere (Gendarmerie Charleroi), Chantry (Gendarmerie Liège), De Wulf (police Bruges), Demey (gendarmerie Bruges), Heymans (police Brussels), Hogervorst (police Amsterdam), de Jong (police Rotterdam), van Kleef (police Arnhem), Lovenfosse (Police Liège), Martens (police Amsterdam), Regterschot (police Arnhem)  
Other participants to the conference (delegations from participating countries, Belgian and Dutch accompanying officers, etc)

Programme May 9:

09.00h Wellcome adress (van Zunderd)  
09.15h Official opening (Opstelten)  
09.30h The policy framework (de Knop)  
10.00h Administrative and police structures during the championship (Bliki)  
10.30h Questions

10.45h Coffee break  
11.15h Information management (Brekelmans)  
11.45h Discussion and questions  
12.30h Lunch  
14.00h Up-dated risk analysis (van Peer)  
15.30h Tea break  
16.00h Tasking, setting of parameters and supra-local deployment of foreign police teams based on the scednario of the England --Germany match in Charleroi (Hardy)  
16.45h Logistic aspects (Takkenberg)  
17.00h Questions and discussions  
17.30h Closure

Programme May 10:

09.00h Opening (de Knop)  
09.15h Complimentary measures (Mannen)  
09.35h The interface with the Euro2000 foundation (Heinis)  
10.00h Tasking and approach of the railway police during Euro2000 (Boudin)  
10.30h Coffee break  
11.00h Public prosecutions department and the judiciary (Moraal)  
11.40h Evaluation of international police co-operation (Adang)  
12.00h Questions and discussion  
12.30h Lunch  
14.00h Closure by Dutch and Belgian Interior Ministers

## **Appendix III: Schedule of international monitoring team during Euro 2000**

### **June, 8: Arrival (Brussels)**

Briefing by accompanying officers

### **June, 9: Brussels**

- Briefing by binational evaluation team Brussels
- Observing arrival of fans at Brussels airport
- Reconnaissance surroundings of stadium and visit to fanvillage
- Reconnaissance centre of Brussels
- Discussion with team about experiences, making of first report

### **June, 10: Brussels**

- Visit to accreditation centre
- Visit to centre for volunteers
- Attending of briefing for ticket control (given by Mr Verheyen en Delhougne)
- Visit to stadium and interview with Security manager Mr Verheyen
- Interview with Gendarmerie Platoon Commander in charge of outer perimeter
- Visit to GICC and DOCC. Interview with Peter de Wolf and Kol Hendrickx
- Observation Brussels centre (17.00h- 18.00h)
- Observations in and around stadium (18.00h – 22.00h) [Match Belgium- Sweden]
- Observation Brussels centre (22.30h- 00.00h)

### **June 11: Eindhoven**

- Making report
- Travel to Eindhoven.
- Interview with Johan Heijnemans (local evaluation team), Pim Buunen (International affairs)
- Visit to police information centre. Interview with Bert van het Schip
- Visit to stadium. Interview with Security manager Hans van Vlokhoven
- Reconnaissance city centre Eindhoven

### **June 12: Eindhoven and Liege**

- Part of team (Göhring, Merlo, Terraube) travel to Liege
- Liege: meeting with binational evaluation team
- Liege: reconnaissance of city centre
- Liege: observation of arrival and departure by fans (parkings, local transport) and observation in and around stadium (15.00- 22.00h) [Match Germany –Roemenia]
- Travel back to Eindhoven
- Eindhoven: observation Eindhoven centre (12.00h – 15.00h)
- Eindhoven: observation in/ around stadium (17.30h – 23.00h) [Match Portugal – England]
- Eindhoven: observation city centre (23.00h – 00.30h)

### **June 13: Driebergen and Rotterdam**

- Visit to BPIC in Driebergen. Interviews with Theo Brekelmans, Jack van Peer, and liaisons from several countries
- Travel
- Observations in and around stadium Rotterdam (17.00 h – 21.00h). [Match Spain-Norway]

### **June 14: day off**

### **June 15: Eindhoven**

- Interview with Turkish spotters
- Making reports
- Attending police briefings
- Attending briefing for stewards
- Visit to command and control centre inside stadium
- Observations city centre and around stadium (18.00h – 22.30h) [Match Sweden – Turkey]

### **June 16: Charleroi**

- Making reports
- Travel to Brussels (accommodation) and Charleroi
- Visit to Gendarmerie Charleroi, meeting with binational evaluation team
- Reconnaissance fan accommodation (campings) and city centre

### **June 17: Charleroi**

- Making reports
- Observations (10.00h – 23.30h). [Match England- Germany]

### **June, 18: Brussels**

- Making reports

### **June, 19: Brussels**

- Making reports
- Visit to GICC.
- Reconnaissance city centre
- Observations city centre (19.00h – 23.00h)
- Observations in and around stadium (19.00h – 23.00h). [Match Turkey – Belgium]

### **June, 20: Arnhem**

- Travel
- visit to Arnhem police, including command and control rooms, information centre. Interviews with co-operators and commanding officers. Interviews with Cees Bakker (chief constable), Andre de Vries and team
- Visit to stadium. Interview with security manager

### **June, 21: Arnhem**

- Making reports.
- Observations city centre (14.00h – 17.00h and 20.00h 22.00h)
- Observations in and around stadium (17.00h – 20.00h). [Match Slovenia – Norway]

### **June, 22: Driebergen**

- Travel
- Debriefing with Otto Adang
- Travel

### **June 23: day off**

### **June, 24: Bruges**

- Travel
- Reconnaissance Bruges (accompanied by Marina Baert from Bruges police and Captain Dhollander from the Gendarmerie)

### **June, 25: Bruges**

- Attending spotter briefing. Interviews with spotters
- Interview with Gold Commanders Filip de Wulf and Dominique Demey
- Visit to information centre
- Observations in and around stadium (17.00h – 22.00h). [Quarter final: Portugal- France]

### **26 juni: Brussels**

- Meeting with accompanying committee project Police Expertise Euro 2000
- Making reports
- Making preparations

### **June, 27: travel**

### **June, 28: Amsterdam**

- Making reports
- Visit to Amsterdam police. Interviews with Barbara van Kaan (communication), Ed Hogervorst (Gold Commander), visit to information centre
- Visit to Arena stadium. Interview with Karel Breen (security manager) and Theo Damen (liaison police – Arena)
- Reconnaissance Amsterdam

### **June, 29: Amsterdam**

- Observations city centre (14.00h – 16.00h)
- Observations in and around Arena stadium (16.00h – 18.30h). [Match: Netherlands – Italy (Half final)]
- Observations city centre (Dam square) (19.00h – 22.00h)

### **June, 30: the Hague**

- making reports
- visit to EC- centre at Ministry of Internal affairs, interview with Johan Maas

### **July, 1: Rotterdam**

- Interviews with Jelle Egas, Erik van der Horst (Gold Commander) and team
- Interviews with several Silver and Bronze Commanders
- Visit to information centre
- Visit to command and control centre
- Visit to video room

- Observations city centre and festival area (18.00h - 24.00h)

### **July, 2: Rotterdam**


- Observations in and around stadium (18.00h –23.30h). Match France- Italy
- Observation in city centre (23.30h – 00.30h)

### **July, 3: Rotterdam**

- Finishing reports
- Discussing final conclusions
- Debriefing with Otto Adang
- Travel and departure



## Appendix V: International police co-operation questionnaire



Date: \_\_\_\_\_, City: \_\_\_\_\_, Match: \_\_\_\_\_,

Foreign police teams encountered:

By a combination of observations and discussions, you may be able to assess several aspects included in the EU handbook. Please fill out the questionnaire based on your collective assessment after each day of observation.

Wherever necessary, make a distinction between police teams from different countries. It is of course possible that you cannot answer all questions for every city/ foreign team. Every question could be supplemented with “as far as you can tell”. Please explain and specify your answers.

### Preparation by police forces

Was the scale and composition of the respective team adequate (enough team members, experienced and knowledgeable team members)?

Did the respective foreign teams have sufficient time to prepare themselves?

What function did the respective teams fulfill? (may be different for different countries)

- Intelligence gathering
- Reconnaissance
- Spotting
- Crowd control under police supervision
- Other (specify)

Did the respective teams provide an adequate risk analysis?

Were the respective foreign teams sufficiently informed beforehand?

Do you have any suggestions regarding this issue for future occasions?

### Police co-operation

In this city, is maximum use being made of support that foreign police forces supply?

In this city, is foreign police support part of the local tactical plan?

On this occasion, did the respective teams have added value?

Were the respective foreign police teams adequately provided with:

- accreditation
- physical safety
- accompanying police officers with adequate knowledge
- sufficient interpreters

- communications equipment
- other necessities (specify)
- own equipment (specify)

Did the respective foreign police teams supervise risk fans all the way?

Do you have any suggestions regarding this issue for future occasions?

### **Information exchange**

In this city, did clear lines of communication and adequate information facilities exist for foreign police?

In this city, did the Belgian and Dutch information officers attached to the foreign police teams properly channel information to and from the proper authorities?

Do you have any suggestions regarding this issue for future occasions?

### **Co-operation between police and stewards**

In this city, do police forces and steward organisations work together on a complementary basis?

In this city, do police forces work with senior officials from steward organisations, are these placed in the police's command centre, do they have the information they need to carry out their tasks?

In this city, is information from the stewards' organisations channelled to police authorities?

In this city, do stewards adequately fulfill their tasks?

Do you have any suggestions regarding this issue for future occasions?

## Appendix II

### Selection and training of observers

1. Selection of the observers
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#### Objective and profile

The goal of a specific selection of persons lay in the scientific approach of the project on the one hand and in the specificity of aptitudes required for “observation” on the other. For the benefit of the *scientific nature of the approach*, the observers team had to be made up of a diversity of both internal and external persons. This made it possible to avoid potential biases regarding observation, the influences on the situation to observe and the objectivity of the survey. These requirements entailed the selective orientation towards diverse fields from which individual observers were selected.

Observation itself *required the individual observer to have certain aptitudes* that ensured minimal negative influence on sensory perceptions. These requirements led to the profile of the observers searched for.

#### Selection

Both in the Netherlands and in Belgium, selection was made as much as possible within a diversity of fields. The observers came from various fields within the police (training, public order, public relations, observation teams, ...). They were assisted by a number of persons from outside the police (students in criminology or one of the behavioural sciences).

#### The individual profile

The individual candidates had to meet following requirements:

1. volunteering for candidature;
2. being motivated;
3. having a good physical condition;
4. having a sense of initiative;
5. being able to work independently;
6. knowing how to work with Windows Word/Excel;
7. being available in the period during which matches were to be played in a particular host city;
8. at least speaking the language used in the host city;
9. possible experience in information processing.

## 2. Training of the observers

### **Observers training**

The observers' training was organised in one day of theory and additional practical exercises. Besides that, observers had to carry out at least one test observation with reporting of a preparatory match, followed by feedback on reporting. Finally, the teams were classified per host city and a work file was drawn up on the basis of exploration and contacts.

Two training sessions were organised:

1. March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2000 in Hoogerheide with test observation at the Belgium-Netherlands match of March 29<sup>th</sup>, 2000 in Brussels.
2. April 18<sup>th</sup>, 2000 in Hoogerheide with test observation at the Netherlands-Scotland match of April 26<sup>th</sup>, 2000 in Arnhem.

### ***Programme day 1:***

- 10.00: introduction Expertise EURO 2000 Project  
10.15: EURO 2000, an overview of the event and the expectations  
10.45: police behavioural profile  
11.30: EURO 2000 evaluation: set-up of the survey  
11.45: what is objective observation, tips for observation support  
12.30: lunch  
13.15: practical exercises as regards "objective observation" in general and the "observation of behavioural elements"  
14.00: the Police Expertise project, expectations and restrictions as regards observers  
14.15: observation, use of means and reporting  
15.00: practical exercises "observation as regards crowds", "observation beyond visibility", set-up of the observer  
16.30: agreements for the observation exercise of the test match

### ***Observation of the test match:***

Binational representation of observers per test match

- 14.00: Briefing.  
Host city, perimeter working, representation of supporter groups, stewards and police units.  
Expectations as regards observation and reporting.  
Distribution of files with the classification of the teams, the coloured maps of the surroundings, personal particulars of the different teams and the co-ordinator.  
Distribution of a dictaphone, notebooks and possibly one cellular phone per team.
- 15.30: Exploration of the area by the respective teams.
- 17.00 – 20.00: Observation exercise before the start of the match.
- 20.15: Short debriefing on the field.

## Appendix III:

### Details of methodology

#### a. Procedure observation host city

The emphasis of observations outside the stadium in host cities was laid on the interaction between the police and the public. Observations were recorded instantly on a portable audio recorder. Every fifteen minutes a sample made record of:

- time and position of the observer (subdivided into surroundings stadium: one is in the immediate surroundings of the stadium yet outside the perimeters; city: one is in the city centre of the host city; station: one is in the immediate surroundings of or inside a railway or subway station; parking lot: one is on or in the immediate surroundings of a supporters parking lot or transfer place; miscellanea: one is at a place that does not fit into previous categories; and mobile: one is moving around on foot/by bus or otherwise in-between two aforementioned possibilities. The difference between “miscellanea” and “mobile” is that the latter implies that one is on one’s way to any of the possibilities (including “miscellanea”!), whereas “miscellanea” does not mean one is heading to a specific destination.);
- type of sample: static or dynamic. When observing, one has to choose between static observation (the observer picks a location and remains there for at least one hour) or dynamic observation (the observer follows a particular rather large group of supporters, wherever it goes, also for at least one hour);
- persons present (type and number). Following groups are distinguished between: visitors (supporters of the first team, supporters of the second team, persons whose preference is unknown), police (in regular police uniform, or in partial or complete riot uniform), security personnel (including stewards), press, third parties and vehicles (police vehicles such as police motorbikes and recognisable police cars, riot police vehicles, water cannon and helicopters).  
For each category of supporters, one notes the percentage of women, the percentage of persons younger than 12 and older than 35, the percentage to be characterised as boisterous (clear mind yet (very) lively as to physical motion: jumping, running and so on) or as drunk, the percentage of persons dressed in team outfit (can be recognised as a supporter of their home country), the absolute number of supporters that is disguised (face covered) or apparently armed (bottles, sticks and so on);
- activity of the persons present. For supporters: talking, singing, other activities.

#### Interaction

Interaction always relates to the interactions between groups of supporters or interactions between a group of supporters and police

Three aspects of interaction have to be determined:

- **distance** between the persons present. The distances are indicated in percentages of the total number of persons present for each combination who find themselves at a certain distance of one another. It concerns the distance between the persons involved of one group compared to the other group, not the distance of persons involved within a group. There are four categories of distance: nearby (persons involved are within 1m of one another - “talking and hitting distance”), at a distance (persons involved are at a distance where they cannot touch one another in a physical manner yet they are still within reach of thrown objects), far away (persons involved are at a distance from which thrown objects

cannot reach the other group but both groups can still see one another) and out of sight (persons involved are at such a distance that they cannot see one another);

- **interaction at sample time:** a distinction was made between the following sorts of interaction: none (no interaction between the persons involved), verbal - aggressive (verbal interaction of aggressive nature, such as cursing and swearing), verbal - non-aggressive (verbal interaction that is not of aggressive nature), non-verbal - aggressive (non-verbal interaction, by means of gestures and others, of aggressive nature such as shaking one's fist or finger), non-verbal - non-aggressive (non-verbal interaction by means of gestures and others that is not of aggressive nature) and violence (interaction that could entail physical (harmful) consequences, such as throwing objects, pushing around and actual physical violence);
- **incidents.** For each sample, it was determined whether an “incident” had occurred in the past 15 minutes or whether police intervention had taken place. In case of “incidents”, a distinction was made between small (a quarrel involving at most four individuals), medium (a quarrel involving at least 5 and at most 10 individuals) and larger (a quarrel involving more than 10 individuals). Police intervention was subdivided into arrest, removal/dispersion and stopping.

Outside sample time, qualitative impressions were recorded. The tapes were transcribed as soon as possible. Quantitative data were entered into structured Excel-files, qualitative observations were put down in 24-h reports and individual diaries.

## **b. Procedure observation site**

The observations near the site / stadium were mainly directed towards the manner in which stewards, collaborators of private security services and police services collaborated. This was obviously related to the manner in which stewards took up their responsibilities. A distinction was made between observations on the site before the match and observations inside the stadium during the match.

### *Before the match: site observation*

The observers arrived at the site 2 ½ hours before the starting signal of the match or at the opening of the site. In this phase, the observation was limited to the surroundings of the stadium. During these 2 ½ hours an entrance was chosen and the observer remained posted there for at least half an hour. After each ½ hour, another entry point in the outer or inner perimeter was chosen.

For each entry point, the observer started by recording the following data on portable audio recorder: time, physical lay out of entry point (turnstiles, fences, passageways and so on), number of turnstiles, entrances, stewards, police officers, and security agents, as well as the percentage of female stewards/ female police officers and the location of stewards, police officers and security agents.

Every 15 minutes a sample was taken regarding the nature of access control and body searches being performed. (how was the body search done? In a friendly, rough or informative manner?). What was the activity of stewards, police officers and security agents during sample time: talk with police, security, public or perform job specific activities (such as control, body search). Did stewards call for the help of police and/or security in the past 15 minutes? minutes.

If any of the types of incidents mentioned below occurred at the entrance gate observed (at any time), the type of incident was recorded, as well as the number and nature of the persons involved and the solution found for the incident:

- ✓ disagreement on entrance (invalid ticket, ticket for the wrong section, stadium ban and so on)
- ✓ possession of fireworks
- ✓ throwing of objects
- ✓ possession of unwanted objects
- ✓ excessive alcohol consumption
- ✓ violence against an object
- ✓ violence against an individual
- ✓ violence against a group of persons
- ✓ provocation
- ✓ discrimination
- ✓ possession of drugs
- ✓ possession of arms
- ✓ arrest or removal of a supporter

*During the match: stadium observation*

During the match, the observer gathered information inside the stadium. At most one of the observers (a different one for each match) entered the stadium per match.

The observers chose a section in the first half time and stayed there. For the second half time, another section was chosen. Every 15 minutes, the following data were recorded on portable audio recorder.

Time and location (section). Number and nature of supporters in the section. Number of (visible) stewards, police officers, and security agents. Type of interaction between supporters, stewards, police officers and security agents. Activities of stewards, police officers and security agents.

If members from the public entered the playing field or any of the types of incidents mentioned above occurred in the section under observation (at any time), the type of incident was recorded, as well as the number and nature of the persons involved and the solution found for the incident.

Outside sample time, qualitative impressions were recorded. The tapes were transcribed as soon as possible. Quantitative data were entered into structured Excel-files, qualitative observations were put down in 24-h reports and individual diaries.

### **c. Procedure observation information centre**

The observer in the information centre observer had two tasks:

1. to inform the other members of the team about important events on the street. The team members had to inform him of their whereabouts;
2. to gather structured data at the information centre. The information centre observers did not have to try to keep track of all messages. This is impossible to do and was not necessary to the project. The observations were oriented towards the information exchange between the information centre and the (bi)national information centre and the information exchange between the information centre and the spotters' teams.

Specifically, data were recorded (for an hour at a time) on paper on the types of products (incidental information, situation reports, verifications, threat analysis) made for the benefit of and received from the (bi)national information centre and the use made of these products. Alternately, the observer recorded data (for an hour at a time) on the types of products (incidental information, situation reports, verifications, threat analysis) made for the benefit of and received from the spotters and the use made of these products.

The observer attempted to record the following details:

- How often was contact made (average number per hour), subdivided according to the nature of the contact (4 categories: ask questions or give information; incidental information, situation reports, verification, threat analysis; information on supporters or police action; information on facts or expectations/intentions)?
- What was done with the information (discussed with whom, sent to whom)?
- Was the (given or sent) information in general current (still in accordance with reality)?
- Was the (given or sent) information in general accurate (sufficiently detailed for its purpose)?
- Was the (given or sent) information in general clear?
- Was the (given or sent) information in general correct?
- Did the (given or sent) information in general apply to facts or interpretations?
- Was the (given or sent) information in general sufficient (did it meet the information need)?
- Was the information in general evaluated before being sent?

At the end of each observation day, the observer completed a checklist containing the above points.

At the end of the observation period in the host city, all of the team members who had made observations at the information centre, made a description of the set-up of the information centre. Special attention was given to communication facilities available and used, embeddedness in the police organisation, the distinction between levels in the transfer of information (administrative, strategic, tactical, operational), the presence of liaisons. The set-up was to be compared with the actual situation (were the facilities used, who was actually present, were there many disturbances?)

## Appendix V

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